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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Recent high-profile events from the Columbia space shuttle 
disaster and Catholic Church sex scandal to the debacles at major 
U.S. corporations and financial institutions have caused a renewed 
interest in the subject of organizational misconduct.1 Yet we still 
know relatively little about this extremely important subject. For ex-
ample, what induces large and important segments of an organization 
to engage in or ignore deviant behavior? What does and should our 
legal system do to deter such behavior? Are we currently doing 
enough?  
 This Article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of 
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (the OSGs) in 1991, the 
United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of 
strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational 
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 1. John Schwartz & Matthew L. Wald, Report on Loss of Shuttle Focuses on NASA Blunders and 
Issues Somber Warning, N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 2003, at A1 (quoting a report of the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board that blames NASAs broken safety culture for the Columbia disaster); David 
France, Our Fathers: The Secret Life of the Catholic Church in an Age of Scandal (2004) (discuss-
ing the role of the Catholic Church hierarchy in sustaining and covering up the sexual misconduct of 
numerous priests). Organizational misconduct--conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the organi-
zation--should be distinguished from occupational misconduct--conduct undertaken solely to benefit the 
perpetrator and in which the organization may actually be the victim. See Marshall Clinard & R. 
Quinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology 188 (2d ed. 1973) (dividing white collar crime into 
two types: corporate crime and occupational crime); John Braithwaite, White Collar Crime, 11 Ann. 
Rev. Soc. 1, 19 (1985) (same). Common examples of occupational misconduct include embezzlement 
and the acceptance of kickbacks. In addition, the term organizational misconduct encompasses actions 
by all organizations, including corporations, nonprofits, and government entities, and includes not only 
crimes, but torts and violations of the organizations ethics or conduct codes, even when such violations 
are not illegal. See, e.g., Laura Shill Schrager & James F. Short, Jr., Toward a Sociology of Organiza-
tional Crime, 25 Soc. Probs. 407 (1978) (defining organizational crime). 
2 FLORIDA STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
liability.2 Under this system, organizational liability for agent mis-
conduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exer-
cised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under tradi-
tional agency principles of respondeat superior.  Courts and agencies 
typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by 
inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance 
structures ostensibly designed to detect and discourage such con-
duct.3 
 I argue, however, that any duty-based liability system that 
conditions the organizations duty on the presence of internal compli-
ance structures is likely to fail because courts lack sufficient informa-
tion about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal 
compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of 
largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal li-
ability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct. 
This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of or-
ganizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but in-
effective internal compliance structures.  
 I then explore two possible explanations for the U.S. legal 
systems move toward a compliance-based liability regime: (1) an 
over-reliance on agency cost explanations for organizational miscon-
duct and (2) public choice explanations. I argue that an overreliance 
on agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct and rent-
seeking by powerful interest groups both contribute to the growth of 
internal compliance-based liability regimes. As a result, the United 
States legal regime is likely to continue its march toward duty-based 
liability regimes that rely on internal compliance structures in assess-
ing liability or sanctions, because deep-rooted theoretical and politi-
cal forces conspire to promote such a regime. 
 Part II of this Article discusses the three primary methods for 
assigning firm-level liability for agent misconduct: strict vicarious li-
ability, negligence, and a composite liability regime that combines 
elements of both negligence and strict liability.4 Both negligence and 
composite liability regimes require a court or agency determination 
regarding whether the organization has met its duty of care, typically 
                                                                                                             
 2. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Legal 
Stud. 833, 836 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime closely approximates a rule of pure strict 
vicarious liability). 
 3. See infra Part III.A (defining the term internal compliance structures).  This move toward 
compliance-oriented regulation is part of a global trend.  See Christine Parker, Reinventing Regulation 
Within the Corporation, 32 (5) ADMININSTRATION & SOCIETY 529, 529-30 (2000). 
 4. Hereafter, negligence-based vicarious liability and composite liability regimes are collectively 
referred to as duty-based liability regimes, except where the context requires a distinction between the 
two. 
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determined by reference to the organizations internal compliance 
structures. However, because courts and agencies lack reliable infor-
mation regarding the effectiveness of such structures, internal com-
pliance-based liability systems are likely to fail. As elaborated in Part 
II, this does not mean that strict vicarious liability systems are perfect 
or costless. However, many of these costs can be minimized through 
evidentiary privilege rules, mitigation rules that reward reporting and 
cooperation after the discovery of organizational misconduct, and 
various other relatively mild changes to the legal regime. 
 Part III argues that, although the OSGs are typically held out 
as an ideal model of duty-based organizational liability, large and im-
portant areas of United States law are actually duty-based organiza-
tional liability regimes. Indeed, in many areas of law--including envi-
ronmental, tort, employment discrimination, corporate, securities, 
and health careorganizational liability for agent misconduct is de-
termined either through a composite regime that assigns blame based 
on a strict liability standard and determines sanctions based on a neg-
ligence standard or a negligence-based regime that bases organiza-
tional liability on a finding that the organization failed to satisfy the 
standard of due care. In both cases, the organizations negligence is 
determined by reference to a standard of due care that rewards or-
ganizations for (and, correspondingly, punishes organizations for the 
lack of) internal compliance structures.  
 Part IV argues, however, that the presumed effectiveness of 
duty-based liability regimes that premise organizational culpability 
on the presence of internal compliance structures is backed by little, 
if any, empirical support. Although there has been relatively little 
comprehensive study of the impact of internal compliance structures 
on the incidence of organizational misconduct, the available empiri-
cal evidence does not support the contention that the internal compli-
ance structures typically examined by courts and regulators in assess-
ing organizational due care reduce organizational misconduct. In-
deed, several large-scale empirical studies document a positive corre-
lation between organizational misconduct and the types of internal 
compliance structures most frequently relied on by courts and regula-
tors in assessing liability and sanctions, suggesting that some organi-
zations may employ internal compliance structures primarily as a 
window-dressing mechanism that provides both market legitimacy 
and reduced organizational liability for agent misconduct. 
 Part V explains that, rather than an effective system for deter-
ring organizational misconduct, the U.S. legal regime may have 
adopted a costly safe harbor that allows organizations to evade li-
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ability for organizational misconduct, so long as they have adopted 
internal compliance structures.5 I then explore some possible reasons 
for the legal regimes extreme reliance on internal compliance struc-
tures in assessing organizational culpability, despite their poor em-
pirical showing as a means of reducing organizational misconduct. 
Although it is of course possible that the legal regimes enthusiastic 
embrace of internal compliance-based organizational liability is at-
tributable to a simple misplaced faith in the effectiveness of internal 
compliance structures in deterring organizational misconduct, this 
Article suggests that the answer is likely far more complicated and 
may be due to two factors.  
 First, it is possible that the legal regimes embrace of internal 
compliance structures is partly attributable to an over-reliance on 
agency cost explanations for organizational misconduct. In other 
words, if the legal regime presumes that organizational misconduct is 
simply a principal-agent problem, legal incentives that induce princi-
pals to more carefully police their agents may be a rational response 
to that perceived problem.  
 Second, public choice theory may explain some aspects of the 
legal regimes dependence on internal compliance structures as an 
organizational liability determinant. As discussed in this Article, al-
though the implementation of comprehensive internal compliance 
structures is costly to organizations, it is far less costly than actually 
altering current business practices. As a result, once public outcry 
makes regulation inevitable, organizations may settle, or even push, 
for a legal regime that incorporates internal compliance structures 
into organizational liability determinations. In addition, other power-
ful interest groups have a stake in and benefit from internal compli-
ance-based liability regimes, particularly legal compliance profes-
sionals such as lawyers, compliance and ethics consultants, in-house 
compliance and human resources personnel, and diversity trainers. 
 Part VI briefly addresses the possibility of holding board 
members and senior management vicariously liable for the misdeeds 
of lower-level agents and warns that such liability is unlikely to ef-
fectively substitute for organizational liability.  Part VII concludes. 
 
                                                                                                             
 5. Cf. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 
Wash. U. L.Q. 95 (2004) (querying why corporate interests have not lobbied for such a safe harbor 
from criminal liability). 
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II. THE CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME 
 This Part outlines the three basic organizational liability stan-
dards for agent misconduct-- strict vicarious liability, negligence, and 
composite liability--and the benefits and drawbacks of each.6 I dem-
onstrate that duty-based liability regimes that look to the presence of 
internal compliance structures to determine whether the organization 
has met its duty of care are likely to fail, because courts lack reliable 
information regarding the effectiveness of such structures. As a re-
sult, strict vicarious liability with some modifications to encourage 
reporting and cooperation with government investigations is superior 
to both negligence-based and composite liability systems in deterring 
organizational misconduct and in inducing the appropriate level and 
type of internal enforcement measures.  
A. Strict Vicarious Liability 
 Under a strict vicarious liability standard, organizational li-
ability is imposed whenever an organizational actor causes some pun-
ishable harm, regardless of any attempts by the organization to avoid 
the harm.7 The premise behind strict vicarious liability is that, by 
forcing organizations to internalize all of the costs associated with 
their activities, the organizations products are appropriately priced 
and the socially optimal amount of the good or service is produced.8 
 In addition, strict vicarious liability systems may force the 
adoption of the socially optimal level of internal organizational en-
forcement and deterrence mechanisms (internal compliance struc-
                                                                                                             
 6. It is generally recognized that some type of firm-level liability is necessary in order to effec-
tively deter organizational misconduct for a variety of reasons, including the limited assets of organiza-
tional agents, the superior ability of firm-level liability to force the internalization of the costs of harm-
ful activity, and the potential savings in enforcement costs. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraak-
man, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 687, 692 (1997) (arguing that firm-level liability addresses problems of judgment-proof agents and 
costly government sanctioning); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal 
Stud. 319, 322 (1996) (arguing that firm-level liability saves on enforcement costs because, [r]ather 
than having to invest resources to penetrate the corporate hierarchy and decision-making structure to de-
termine the culpability of particular individuals, the state can simply penalize the firm). However, 
many scholars debate whether this liability should ever take the form of criminal, as opposed to civil or 
administrative, sanctions. See Fischel & Sykes, supra, at 322. In addition, cogent arguments can be 
made that vicarious liability of senior officers and directors for organizational misconduct is, under 
some circumstances, a useful complement to or substitute for organizational liability in deterring organ-
izational misconduct. See infra Part VI (discussing this argument). 
 7. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the organization may be held liable for the acts of its 
agents undertaken with an intent to benefit the organization that are within the ordinary scope of the 
agents employment. I refer to such agents as organizational actors in this Article. 
 8. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 321-22; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top 
Management Matter?, 91 Geo. L.J. 1215, 1223-24 (2003). 
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tures). This is because when an organization bears all of the costs of 
any harm it causes, it has an incentive to reduce the incidence of such 
harm up to the point where the costs of such reduction equal the 
benefits.9 
 Despite these advantages, strict vicarious liability systems 
have been criticized on a number of fronts for creating incentives at 
odds with the goal of deterring organizational misconduct. For exam-
ple, some internal compliance structures, known as policing meas-
ures, may increase the probability of detection, either because in-
formation regarding the occurrence of misconduct may be reported to 
government authorities by the organization or a whistleblower or be-
cause the government may subpoena any information regarding or-
ganizational misconduct that has been internally generated. Accord-
ingly, it has been argued that, under a strict vicarious liability system, 
organizations have an incentive to avoid implementing internal com-
pliance structures that might reduce the incidence of organizational 
wrongdoing.10 This results in increased levels of organizational mis-
conduct and more expensive and less effective government policing 
of such behavior. 
 In addition, some commentators argue that attempts to induce 
internal organizational policing under strict vicarious liability re-
gimes suffer from credibility problems. In other words, firms inter-
nal policing efforts will deter employee misconduct only if employ-
ees believe that firms will actually employ those efforts to detect, re-
port, and punish such misconduct. Under a strict vicarious liability 
system, it is argued, these threats are not credible because the firm it-
self will suffer increased liability from such efforts.11 
 These problems, however, are even more severe under duty-
based organizational liability systems than under strict vicarious li-
ability systems. As discussed in Parts II.B-C of this Article, due to the 
informational disadvantages of courts and regulators regarding the ef-
fectiveness of internal policing measures, any duty-based organiza-
                                                                                                             
 9. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 703; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 324 (arguing that 
monitoring is desirable up to the point where the marginal cost would exceed the marginal social gain in 
the form of reduced harmful activity). 
 10. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 840; Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 708. Arlen and Kra-
akman distinguish policing measures that deter misconduct by increasing the probability of detection 
from preventive measures that deter misconduct by altering the costs or benefits of misconduct but do 
not impact the probability of detection. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 701-02. Examples of pre-
ventive measures include the firms compensation and promotion policies, strict controls over cash dis-
bursements, and strict accounting for chemical waste. Id. According to Arlen and Kraakman, strict vi-
carious liability causes perverse incentive problems with respect to policing measures but not preventive 
measures. Id. at 707. 
 11. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 712-714. 
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tional liability system produces perverse incentives of its own. Spe-
cifically, organizations have an incentive to invest in low-cost, poten-
tially ineffective internal policing measures that fail to reduce organ-
izational misconduct, yet nonetheless reduce organizational liability. 
More disturbing, the analysis of the empirical evidence in Part IV of 
this Article suggests that many firms have adopted exactly this cos-
metic approach to organizational compliance. Furthermore, employ-
ees are keenly aware of the extent to which such policing measures 
are cosmetic, leading to potentially severe credibility problems in any 
duty-based liability regime that relies on internal compliance struc-
tures in assessing guilt or sanctions.12 
In addition, to the extent that policing and credibility concerns 
are potential drawbacks of a strict vicarious liability system, these 
drawbacks are surmountable and need not prevent the implementa-
tion of successful strict (or modified-strict) liability systems. Firms 
can still be encouraged to engage in internal policing and cooperation 
with government authorities through some combination of eviden-
tiary privilege rules and reduced sanctions for cooperation with gov-
ernment investigations. In other words, firms can be rewarded, not 
for the mere existence of internal compliance structures, but for ex 
post demonstrations that such structures revealed useful information 
that was then used to penalize those responsible for misconduct, thus 
presumably deterring future misconduct.  
 First, fears that subsequent government or third-party access 
to information produced by internal compliance structures will deter 
the implementation of such structures can be addressed through privi-
lege rules, such as those employed by many states in connection with 
internal environmental and other audits.13  Similarly, attorney-client 
privilege has been successfully invoked in some cases to shield cor-
                                                                                                             
 12.See, e.g., Ethics Resource Center, National Business Ethics Survey 31 (2003) (finding that 
[e]mployees who perceive that their supervisors do more than talk about the importance of ethics ob-
serve less misconduct in their organizations); Ethics Officer Association, The 2000 Member Survey 
Report 30 (2000) (listing short term financial pressures, lack of financial or staff support, and compensa-
tion system inconsistent with corporate values as three of the top four principal obstacles to the work of 
ethics officers); Marshall Clinard, Corporate Ethics and Crime: The Role of Middle Management 132-
36 (1983) (concluding from interviews with 64 retired managers of Fortune 500 corporations that the 
behavior and philosophy of top management was most commonly asserted as the primary reason for il-
legal employee behavior); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Perform-
ance: Managerial Commitments, External Pressures, Corporate Ethical Practices, 42(5) Academy of 
Mgmt. J. 539, 547 (1999) (finding that top management commitment to ethical behavior is more impor-
tant in deterring misconduct than are external forces, such as the OSGS, which tend to promote only 
formal changes, such as the adoption of ethics codes, that are not fully integrated into organizational ac-
tivities). 13
 David Markert, Nicole Devero, & Brendan Donahue, Environmental Crimes, 41 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 443, 461-62 (2004) (discussing environmental, attorney-client, and other privileges designed to 
protect internal corporate audits). 
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porate audits from discovery and disclosure.14  In other words, rules 
mandating that any information produced through internal policing 
measures will not be used against the organization, provided that the 
organization cooperates with any government investigation, could al-
leviate this concern and improve the deterrence function of strict li-
ability.15 
 The proper role of privilege in organizational policing and en-
forcement is subject to much debate.  The use of such privileges 
doubtless raises concerns of its own, and may be more appropriate or 
practical in connection with some types of violations than others.16  
The point here, however, is that the most commonly advocated sub-
stitute for audit privileges  duty-based organizational liability re-
gime  presents even greater problems.17 
 Fears that firms will fail to implement internal policing meas-
ures under a strict vicarious liability system can be further alleviated 
through rules that reward organizations for post-offense reporting and 
cooperation. For example, if organizations are offered reduced penal-
ties in exchange for self-detection and reporting, the incentive to im-
plement policing measures under a strict liability regime may be sub-
stantially increased. In fact, such reduced penalties in exchange for 
self-reporting and cooperation already exist under the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines and also are employed informally in connec-
tion with many investigations and prosecutions of organizational 
misconduct.18  
                                                                                                             
14 Id. 
 15. Professors Arlen and Kraakman refer to this version of modified strict liability as probability-
fixed strict liability, and argue that it is unworkable in both practice and theory. Arlen & Kraakman, su-
pra note 6, at 719-21. As a practical matter, they argue that modified strict liability is unworkable be-
cause it is not truly possible to insulate a firm from the liability effects of its own policing efforts. Id. 
at 720. However, evidentiary privileges such as these are successfully used throughout criminal law to 
prevent government authorities from accessing certain information. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, et al., 
Criminal Procedure §§9.1-9.6 (discussing the fruit of the poisonous tree and other exclusionary rules of 
criminal procedure). As a theoretical matter, Arlen and Kraakman argue that it would require prohibi-
tively large sanctions in order to induce firms to police against low-visibility misconduct. Arlen & Kra-
akman, supra note 6, at 720.  However, this is true as a practical matter with respect to duty-based or-
ganizational liability regimes as well. 
16
 See, e.g., Steven A. Herman, NCSL Study Finds That State Environmental Audit Laws Have 
No Impact on Company Self Auditing and Disclosure of Violations, 13 Nat'l Envtl. Enforcement J. 18, 
19 (Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999)(finding that more than three-fourths of companies surveyed report performing 
audits without regard to the existence of audit laws, but that most also fail to report violations, even 
when the state provides an audit privilege); David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives Of Environmental 
Audit Immunity,  81 Iowa L. Rev. 969 (1996) (discussing the debate over these privileges). 
17
 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, When Companies Come Clean: Mitigation is 
Better Than Environmental Audit Privileges, 9-FEB Bus. L. Today 46 (2000) (arguing that a compli-
ance-based organizational liability regime is preferable to the use of internal audit privileges). 
 18. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(g) (2004) [hereinafter Sentencing Guide-
lines] (listing organizational cooperation in the investigation and voluntary self-reporting of the offense 
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 In short, the problems identified by commentators in connec-
tion with a strict vicarious liability regime are real, but are not insur-
mountable obstacles to an effective strict vicarious liability regime.  
Several relatively minor changes to the current legal regime (some of 
which have already been implemented with apparent success in cer-
tain regulatory settings), may alleviate many of the concerns ex-
pressed by critics of strict vicarious liability regimes.  Finally, as de-
tailed in Part II.C. below, internal compliance-based organizational 
liability regimes pose similar, and arguably more severe, problems.  
B. Negligence 
 Under a negligence-based organizational liability regime, 
firm-level liability is imposed whenever an organizational actor 
caused some punishable harm and the standard of due care was not 
met. Typically, this means that the organization failed to take suffi-
cient measures to avoid the harm; for example, it failed to implement 
training programs or other internal compliance structures or to ob-
serve industry standards regarding operating methods. 
 Negligence-based organizational liability regimes are consid-
ered inferior to strict liability regimes in terms of encouraging the so-
cially optimal level of production, because negligence-based organ-
izational liability regimes do not force organizations to bear the entire 
cost of their harmful conduct.19 Accordingly, goods and services pro-
duced by organizations in such a regime will be underpriced, and too 
much will be produced.20 
 Furthermore, strict vicarious liability standards are considered 
superior to negligence-based organizational liability standards in 
terms of inducing the optimal level of internal compliance structures. 
Although negligence-based liability could in theory induce the opti-
                                                                                                             
among several culpability factors); Memorandum Regarding Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations, United States Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson, January 20, 
2003, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_ guidelines.htm (stating that, [i]n deter-
mining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdo-
ing and its willingness to cooperate with the government's investigation may be relevant factors.); 
Shirah Neiman, Corporate Fraud Issues II: Interview With United States Attorney James B. Comey 
Regarding The Department Of Justice's Policy On Requesting Corporations Under Criminal Investiga-
tion To Waive The Attorney Client Privilege And Work Product Protection, November 2003, United 
States Attorney's Bulletin, 1456 PLI/Corp 1089 (2004)(discussing the role of corporate cooperation 
with prosecutors in inducing leniency). 
 19. See, e.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 705; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 328; 
Khanna, supra note 8, at 1226 (stating that negligence standards tend to fail on the activity level front 
because they do not force the firm to bear the full social costs of its products); Steven Shavell, Strict 
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1980).  
 20. Shavell, supra note 19, at 4. 
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mal level of internal deterrence measures, it is unlikely to achieve 
this goal in practice due to the difficulty of accurately determining 
whether the standard of care has been met.  
 Judicial and agency determinations regarding whether a par-
ticular organizations internal compliance structures meet the re-
quired standard of due care may be faulty for a variety of reasons. 
First, courts and agencies may require either too many or too few 
structures in setting the standard because they lack sufficient infor-
mation to make such decisions accurately.21 As a result, they may 
demand internal compliance structures whose costs exceed their de-
terrence benefits, resulting in social waste. Alternatively, they may 
demand too few internal compliance structures, or internal compli-
ance structures that are ineffective in deterring misconduct, resulting 
in under-deterrence. Second, even assuming that courts and agencies 
are able to accurately set the standard of care, they are likely to mis-
judge whether the organization has met that standard (in other words, 
whether it has adopted the appropriate number and type of structures) 
in the particular case at hand.22  
 Finally, courts and agencies are unlikely to possess the ability 
to differentiate effective internal compliance structures from cosmetic 
ones--that is, those structures designed to create the illusion of com-
pliance for purposes of avoiding legal liability, rather than for the 
purpose of deterring misconduct.23 This is because differentiating real 
internal compliance structures from purely symbolic ones is a diffi-
cult task for legal decisionmakers, particularly ex post when, by defi-
nition, the structures in question have failed to deter misconduct. Ad-
ditionally, the indicators of an effective internal compliance structure 
are easily mimicked, and the true level of effectiveness is difficult for 
any decisionmaker lacking perfect information to determine.24 
 This is not to imply that accurate determinations by courts 
and agencies regarding whether internal compliance structures are 
cosmetic or real are impossible. Presumably, given sufficient 
amounts of time and money, reliable determinations as to the quality 
of internal compliance could be made. However, as a society, we 
have shown no willingness to dedicate the extraordinary resources to 
                                                                                                             
 21. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 6, at 329; Khanna, supra note 8, at 1227-28; Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 487 
(2003) (arguing that because legal decisionmakers are unable to determine this with any accuracy, inter-
nal compliance-based liability regimes tend to both under-deter misconduct and impose socially waste-
ful costs on organizations). 
 22. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1228. 
 23. See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 536-37. 
 24. Id. at 491-92. 
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courts, prosecutors, and agencies that would be necessary to perform 
this function. Moreover, given the lower costs and greater effective-
ness of an appropriately designed strict vicarious liability regime, this 
refusal is probably wise. 
C. Composite Regimes 
 Composite regimes are organizational liability regimes that 
combine elements of both strict vicarious liability and negligence. In 
its most common form, composite liability regimes assign liability 
based on a strict liability standard but apportion sanctions based on a 
negligence standard.25 Although the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines are typically offered as an example of such a regime, as 
discussed in Part III of this Article, large segments of the United 
States legal regime relating to organizational liability for agent mis-
conduct are best characterized as composite regimes. Others, despite 
their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious liability regimes, are ac-
tually negligence regimes, due to prosecutorial and agency discretion 
and judicially-crafted exceptions to the strict vicarious liability rule.  
 Despite the popularity of composite regimes among legal 
scholars and government actors, as discussed in Part IV of this Arti-
cle, little evidence exists to support the theory that composite liability 
regimes that incorporate organizational internal compliance struc-
tures into the sanction calculation deter organizational misconduct. In 
fact, a growing body of empirical evidence casts doubt on the effec-
tiveness of such regimes. 
 These results should not be entirely surprising. Composite re-
gimes, at least in practice, present all of the same incentive problems 
discussed in connection with negligence regimes. In other words, 
negligence-based organizational liability regimes are criticized for a 
failure to force organizations to fully internalize the costs of their 
harmful activities. This same criticism, however, can be leveled at 
composite regimes. Strict liability regimes, after all, only force the in-
ternalization of costs if the appropriate sanction is applied.26 By re-
ducing the applicable sanctions based on a factor--the presence of in-
ternal compliance structures--unrelated to either the amount of harm 
or the probability of detection, the composite regime moves away 
from the optimal sanction, reducing the extent to which the sanc-
                                                                                                             
 25. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 717 (referring to such regimes as mixed liability re-
gimes). 
 26. This optimal sanction is equal to the harm caused divided by the probability of detection. See 
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given 
the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 Intl Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1993). 
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tioned organization is forced to internalize the costs of its harmful 
conduct.27 
 In addition, negligence-based organizational liability regimes 
are criticized for, at least in practice, failing to provide incentives for 
the adoption of the optimal level and type of internal compliance 
structures. This same criticism, however, can and should be leveled at 
composite regimes. As under the negligence-based regime, courts and 
agencies may err in setting the standard by including too few, too 
many, or an inappropriate type of internal compliance structure in the 
due care standard.  Furthermore, because courts and agencies lack 
sufficient information regarding the effectiveness of internal compli-
ance structures, they are likely to err in determining whether a par-
ticular organization has met the standard in any given case and, in 
any event, are unlikely to possess the ability to differentiate symbolic 
or cosmetic compliance structures, designed primarily to avoid liabil-
ity rather than to deter misconduct, from genuine ones.28 
III. UNITED STATES LAW AS A COMPOSITE LIABILITY REGIME 
 This Part demonstrates that, although the Organizational Sen-
tencing Guidelines (OSG) are correctly held out as the paradigm of a 
composite liability regime, large and important segments of United 
States law are best characterized as composite regimes.29 Others, de-
spite their theoretical similarity to strict vicarious liability regimes, 
are actually negligence regimes due to prosecutorial and agency en-
forcement discretion and judicially-crafted exceptions from the strict 
vicarious liability standard. In both cases, the determination of 
whether the organization has met the standard of due care is deter-
mined by reference to the presence of internal compliance structures. 
                                                                                                             
 27. Presumably, composite regimes that reward organizations for the presence of internal compli-
ance structures do so on the assumption that such structures increase the probability of detection, and le-
gal scholars defend composite regimes on exactly this basis. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 733. As 
discussed in Part IV of this Article, however, when internal compliance structures are cosmetic, rather 
than real, and legal decisionmakers are unable to tell the difference, internal compliance structures can-
not be expected to reduce misconduct or increase the probability of detection. 
 28. Krawiec, supra note 21, at 541 (arguing that not only are courts unable to make this distinction 
but that a review of the case law demonstrates that, in many cases, they do not even try). 
29 On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal sentencing guidelines should be 
interpreted by judges as merely advisory, rather than mandatory, to avoid violating criminal defendants 
Sixth Amendment rights.  United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).  Although it is unclear how this 
ruling will impact organizational sentencing, many corporate lawyers are advising clients to continue 
treating the OSGs as if they were mandatory.  Guy Fields, Ruling on Sentencing Guidelines May Also 
Affect Corporate Crime, Wall St. J. A4 (Jan. 17, 2005) (quoting one corporate counsel as stating that, 
as far as corporations are concerned, the compliance guidelines are not advisory, they are still manda-
tory.) 
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Part III.A of this Article defines the term internal compliance struc-
tures and illustrates the type of internal compliance structures that 
are most prevalent in United States organizations. Part III.B describes 
the role of these internal compliance structures in the U.S. legal re-
gime by characterizing a broad array of laws as either composite or 
negligence-based liability regimes that incorporate internal compli-
ance structures into the organizational due care assessment. 
A. Internal Compliance Structures Defined 
 The internal compliance structures adopted by most organiza-
tions are quite similar and are based primarily on two legal sources: 
the minimum steps for an effective internal compliance system set 
out in the OSGs30 and equal employment opportunity (EEO) law.31 
For example, the centerpiece of any internal compliance program is a 
written ethics or conduct code that sets forth the ostensible limits of 
acceptable agent conduct.32 Most large organizations also have writ-
ten EEO policies that confirm the organizations commitment to non-
discriminatory hiring, firing, and promotion policies. Many conduct 
and EEO codes also detail mechanisms of code enforcement, such as 
internal reporting and information gathering procedures, policies re-
garding the investigation of reported violations, whistleblowing pro-
cedures and policies regarding the protection of whistleblowers from 
retaliation, and internal procedures and sanctions for conduct code 
violations.33 
 Second, effective internal compliance requires that conduct 
and EEO codes be communicated to the organizations employees 
and other agents. Common mechanisms for such dissemination in-
                                                                                                             
 30. Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the 
Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. Bus. Ethics 367, 370 (2002). 
 31. EEO law includes a variety of statutes, rules, and regulations addressing workplace discrimi-
nation. The most important of these are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (2000), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000), the rules, regulations and interpre-
tations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and a variety of state statutes. See Elizabeth 
Chamblis & Lauren B. Edelman, Sociological Perspectives on Equal Employment Law, in Laws Dis-
ciplinary Encounters: Readings in Law and Social Science (Victoria Saker Woeste et al. eds., forth-
coming U. of Chicago Press, 2003). 
 32. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 18, § 8B2.1. Over ninety percent of Fortune 500 corpora-
tions and over seventy-five percent of other large corporations report having an ethics or conduct code. 
Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15 
Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 21, 21 (1996); Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18 J. Bus. Ethics 283 (1999). 
 33. Brien, supra note 32, at 21; Richard S. Gruner, Developing Judicial Standards for Evaluating 
Compliance Programs: Insights from EEO Litigation, in 1 Corporate Compliance 2002, at 159, 169 
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1317, 2002). 
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clude training programs, organization newsletters, employee manu-
als, and organizational websites.34 In the EEO context, this communi-
cation often takes the form of diversity or harassment training. 
 Third, organizations must have monitoring and auditing sys-
tems reasonably designed to detect prohibited conduct by organiza-
tional agents.35 Fourth, most organizational compliance programs 
contain a reporting mechanism that allows employees to report viola-
tions of the organizations conduct code or of laws and regulations 
without fear of retaliation by others within the organization.36 This 
includes internal grievance procedures designed to allow employees 
to express concerns regarding discriminatory conduct. Finally, spe-
cific, high-level personnel within the organization must be assigned 
responsibility for oversight of compliance with the organizations 
conduct or ethics code.37 
B. Internal Compliance Structures and Organizational Due Care 
 As widely noted, the OSGs in many ways represent the proto-
typical composite liability regime. For all practical purposes, the 
OSGs require organizations to adopt internal compliance structures 
by reducing to as little as one-twentieth or increasing by as much as 
four hundred percent the original base fine faced by organizations 
convicted of a federal crime based on a variety of mitigating or ag-
gravating factors, including the presence of organizational internal 
compliance structures.38 Assuming the absence of any aggravating 
factors, such as involvement in the violation by high-level personnel, 
the presence of effective internal compliance structures will result 
in a reduction of the organizations fine by up to sixty percent.39 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 18, § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A). 
 35. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A). 
 36. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C). 
 37. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). In addition, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual lists as minimum 
steps for an effective internal compliance system requirements that the organization use due care not to 
delegate authority to agents with a propensity for illegal conduct, that the organization take all reason-
able steps to respond appropriately to the violation and prevent future similar violations once the offense 
is discovered, and that the code of conduct be consistently enforced. Id. §§ 8B2.1(b)(3), (6), (7). 
 38. Other culpability factors include tolerance of or participation in the violations by high-level 
personnel, the organizations prior history of similar misconduct, organizational cooperation in the in-
vestigation, voluntary self-reporting of the offense, and whether the organization accepted responsibility 
for the illegal conduct. Id. § 8C2.5. 
 39. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, effective internal compli-
ance structures are those that are reasonably designed, implemented, and enforced so that [they] gener-
ally [will be] effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct. The failure to prevent or detect the 
instant offense does not necessarily mean that the program is not generally effective. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2). 
The manual goes on to list the minimum steps that the organization must have taken in order to qualify 
for a reduced sentence. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing the minimum steps). 
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 Because the OSGs were one of the first major legal regimes 
to make the transition from strict vicarious liability to an internal 
compliance-based standard, they are an extraordinarily important 
segment of the internal compliance-based legal regime. However, the 
OSG internal compliance-based approach to organizational miscon-
duct was quickly emulated in other legal fields. As a result, today a 
wide variety of civil, criminal, and regulatory provisions encourage 
the adoption of internal compliance structures through duty-based vi-
carious liability regimes. 
 For example, both the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in-
corporate the OSG composite liability concept by allowing reduced 
civil penalties and, in some cases, no criminal penalties for organiza-
tions with effective internal compliance structures.40 Furthermore, the 
HHS guidelines for determining the existence of an effective internal 
compliance program are fashioned directly after the OSGs minimum 
steps for an effective compliance program.41 In addition, the Justice 
Department follows what amounts to a negligence-based organiza-
tional liability regime that considers organizations internal compli-
ance structures in deciding whether to criminally charge organiza-
tions for the acts of their employees and agents.42 Similarly, state at-
torneys general follow a negligence approach by considering organ-
izational internal compliance structures in making enforcement deci-
sions.43 
 The judiciary has also employed compliance-based liability 
standards in a variety of legal contexts that amount to the creation of 
a negligence-based organizational liability regime. For example, in-
ternal compliance structures may be relevant to a determination of 
whether an employees illegal or tortious conduct was undertaken 
with an intent to benefit the organization and thus determine organ-
                                                                                                             
 40. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 
65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000) (statement of policy); see also Office of Inspector Gen-
eral, Dept of Health & Human Servs., Fraud Prevention and Detection: Compliance Guidance, at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005) [hereinafter HHS Guide-
lines] (providing links to compliance program guidance for, among others, pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers, ambulance suppliers, nursing facilities, and hospitals). 
 41. See HHS Guidelines, supra note 40. The Office of the Inspector General of HHS has also re-
quired the adoption of internal compliance structures by organizations settling health care fraud charges. 
See Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of Health Care Compliance 
Programs, 6 Annals Health L. 51, 56 (1997). 
42. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to All Compo-
nent Heads and United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (last updated Mar. 9, 
2000). 
 43. 
Junda Woo, Self-Policing Can Pay Off For Companies, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1993, at B5. 
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izational civil punitive or criminal liability. Organizations may be 
able to demonstrate that an employees conduct was not undertaken 
with an intent to benefit the organization through evidence that the 
organizational defendant had in place ethics codes prohibiting the 
relevant conduct and compliance programs ostensibly designed to de-
tect violations.44  
 Corporate and securities law also contain elements of com-
posite or negligence-based organizational liability regimes that pro-
vide an incentive for the adoption of internal compliance structures. 
Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act, for example, au-
thorizes the SEC to suspend or revoke the registration of any bro-
ker/dealer that has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to 
preventing violations of the provisions of [the securities or commodi-
ties laws], another person who commits such a violation, if such 
other person is subject to his supervision.45 This requirement is 
deemed met so long as procedures reasonably designed to detect and 
prevent violations have been implemented.46 
 The Delaware corporate law approach to claims that a board 
of directors has failed to adequately monitor the corporations em-
ployees and activities closely resembles an internal compliance-based 
approach to liability by holding directors liable for a breach of the 
duty of care when a failure to implement internal compliance struc-
tures results in organizational misconduct.47 Although this liability 
risk may be slight, it appears that corporate boards--at the urging of 
                                                                                                             
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) (suggesting that a corpo-
ration may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies, but that 
the existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee 
in fact acted to benefit the corporation); In re the Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527990, 
at *2 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 1995) (upholding jury instructions that you must consider whether the actions 
of employees were in violation of direct . . . policies of the defendant corporations).  
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2000). 
 46. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i). Similar provisions are contained in the Commodity Exchange Act and in 
the Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) rules. See, e.g., NASD Conduct Rule 3010, National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers Manual (CCH) 4831 (2004) (requiring NASD members to establish and 
maintain a system to supervise employees); NYSE Rule 342.21, 2 New York Stock Exchange Guide 
(CHH) ¶ 2342 (2004) (requiring that trades be subjected to review procedures); Chi. Bd. Options Exch. 
Rules 4.2, 9.8, Chicago Board Options Exchange Guide (CCH) ¶¶ 2082, 2308 (2004); 17 C.F.R. § 
166.3 (2000).  See generally, Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to 
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. Corp. L. 267 (2004) (discussing the diffusion of internal con-
trols, particularly in the financial fraud area). 
 47. In re Caremark Intl Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that in 
order to receive business judgment rule protection, directors must exercise a good faith judgment that 
the corporations information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the board 
that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary opera-
tions). 
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legal professionals--may have overestimated the risk of personal li-
ability.48   
 However, the legal arena that arguably has most ardently em-
braced the composite and negligence-based organizational liability 
approach and, consequently, has had the greatest impact on the adop-
tion of internal compliance structures is EEO law, especially the law 
governing workplace harassment. EEO law incorporates standards of 
organizational due care into organizational liability determinations in 
at least three ways.  
 First, internal compliance structures (especially EEO hiring, 
promotion, and termination policies; grievance procedures; and di-
versity education programs) may operate as a defense against puni-
tive damages in claims of intentional discrimination by allowing or-
ganizations to demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO 
law.49 Although in many cases the defendants compliance structures 
have been found inadequate to insulate the employer from punitive 
damages, other defendants have managed to successfully invoke their 
internal compliance structures as a shield against punitive damages.50 
 Second, the employers EEO-related internal compliance 
structures may be examined--along with other circumstantial evi-
dence--to determine whether the employer harbored discriminatory 
intent.51 In other words, because employers today rarely leave a 
smoking gun that plaintiffs can invoke to demonstrate overt ani-
mus, plaintiffs and defendants alike may rely on circumstantial evi-
                                                                                                             
 48. Because only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight such as an 
utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists leads to director 
liability, the risk of personal liability to directors is probably slight. Id. at 971. Corporate boards, how-
ever, seem to treat the risk as real. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: 
Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797, 
819-20 (2001) (arguing that boards of directors have overestimated the threat of personal liability under 
Caremark). 
 49. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assn, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that employers who are able to 
demonstrate good-faith efforts to comply with EEO law may avoid punitive damages for the discrimina-
tory acts of agents acting within the scope of their employment). 
 50. See, e.g., Bryant v. Aiken Regl Med. Ctrs., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548-49 (4th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that a hospital could not be liable to African-American employees for punitive damages because the 
hospital undertook wide-spread antidiscrimination efforts, including its creation of a hospital-wide anti-
discrimination policy and its implementation of a grievance policy and diversity training program; thus, 
it could not be vicariously liable for its managerial employees discriminatory decisions); Jaudon v. 
Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 172 (D. Md. 2000) (finding that the defendant employer had 
demonstrated a good faith effort to comply with Title VII because it had published, maintained, and 
distributed sexual harassment, open door, and equal opportunity policies). 
 51. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segre-
gation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
1749, 1789-92 (1990) (discussing the unsuccessful use at trial of evidence of internal compliance struc-
tures, especially affirmative action policies, to establish the lack of interest defense in sex discrimination 
cases). 
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dence, including the presence or lack of EEO hiring, promotion, and 
termination policies, diversity training, and the like, in order to dem-
onstrate or disprove intentional discrimination. 
 Finally, the employers internal compliance structures may be 
relevant to a determination of liability in any hostile environment 
harassment claim, especially supervisor hostile environment harass-
ment of which the employer was unaware.52 Employers face liability 
for hostile environment harassment under three different standards. 
First, for coworker hostile environment harassment, the employer is 
judged under a negligence standard and is liable for all harassment of 
which it knew or should have known and negligently failed to cor-
rect. Antiharassment policies, employee training designed to prevent 
harassment, and formal harassment complaint procedures may all 
constitute evidence that the employer was not negligent in failing to 
discover the harassment.53 Similarly, these same EEO-compliance 
structures may be employed to demonstrate that, despite the plaintiff 
employees complaints of harassment, knowledge cannot be imputed 
to the employer.54 
 Second, with regard to supervisor hostile environment har-
assment of which the employer was aware, the employer may be held 
liable for its own negligence in failing to properly respond to the har-
assment. The implementation of internal grievance procedures, anti-
                                                                                                             
 52. Hostile environment harassment occurs when the employers behavior is so severe or perva-
sive that, although there is no tangible harm, such as job loss or decreased pay, the behavior nonetheless 
alters the terms or conditions of employment in violation of Title VII. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). The Supreme Court has also recognized tangible employment actions, 
which involve a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, re-
assignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits, made on the basis of the employees membership in any Title VII protected class. Id. at 761. 
Because the employer faces strict liability for all tangible employment actions, id. at 762-63, however, 
the employers internal compliance structures should not be relevant to a finding of liability in tangible 
employment actions. 
 53. See, e.g., Newtown v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (D. Conn. 1999) (stating that an 
employer must provide an avenue for complaints in order to avoid liability for a negligent failure to 
know of existing harassment); Velez v. City of New Jersey, 817 A.2d 409, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003) (holding that an employer may be held liable for sexual harassment under a theory of negligence 
based upon its failure to have in place well-publicized and enforced anti-harassment policies, effective 
formal and informal complaint structures, training, and/or monitoring mechanisms (quoting Lehmann 
v. Toys R Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 463 (N.J. 1993))).  
 54. See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1298-99 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that because the employers well-publicized harassment policy specified the proper channels 
for harassment complaints and the plaintiff did not follow those channels, knowledge of the plaintiffs 
harassment could not be imputed to the defendant employer); Giuliani v. Stuart Corp., 512 N.W.2d 589, 
595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (When companies institute written policies established to deal intelligently 
with allegations of sexual harassment, it is more likely that management will be informed of any impro-
priety occurring within the company. Companies that fail to institute such policies will naturally find 
themselves vulnerable to the likelihood that knowledge will be imputed to them.). 
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harassment policies, and diversity training may all constitute evi-
dence of a proper response to the harassment.55  
 The cases in which the employers harassment policies and 
procedures will be most relevant, however, are cases of supervisor 
hostile environment harassment of which the employer was unaware. 
In such cases, the employer is held vicariously liable unless it can es-
tablish a two-part affirmative defense: (a) that the employer exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably 
failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.56 
 In adopting the two-pronged affirmative defense, the Supreme 
Court declined to require antiharassment policies and compliance 
procedures as a matter of law and never stated that such policies, 
standing alone, are sufficient to insulate employers from liability for 
supervisor hostile environment harassment. The Court did, however, 
highlight the importance of antiharassment policies and internal 
complaint procedures in establishing the first prong of the defense, 
stating that 
[w]hile proof that an employer had prom-
ulgated an antiharassment policy with com-
plaint procedure is not necessary in every in-
stance as a matter of law, the need for a stated 
policy suitable to the employment circum-
                                                                                                             
 55. See, e.g., Smith v. First Union National Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 244  (4th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that "[a]n employer's adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy is an important factor in determin-
ing whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent any sexually harassing behavior."); Brown v. Perry, 
184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that if "there is no evidence that an employer adopted or ad-
ministered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunc-
tional, the existence of such a policy militates strongly in favor of a conclusion that the employer 'exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent' and promptly correct sexual harassment."); Idusuyi v. State of Tennes-
see Dept. of Children's Services, 2002 WL 220640, at *4 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the employer was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its affirmative defense because it had a policy prohibiting 
sexual harassment, a complaint procedure that the plaintiff failed to use, and a two-hour training session 
on sexual harassment); Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp.2d 328, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent racial harassment because it had adopted 
an anti-harassment policy and a complaint procedure, "the Code of Conduct and Open Door Policy."). 
 56. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 
(adopting the same standard). The second prong of the Supreme Courts test has been criticized at length 
by legal commentators and social scientists, who argue that victims of sexual harassment rarely utilize 
internal complaint procedures for a variety of reasons that are entirely reasonable. See, e.g., Linda Ham-
ilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment--Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Inter-
actions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 169, 181-85 
(2001) (noting that survey data reveals that only two to fifteen percent of sexual harassment victims util-
ize employers internal complaint procedures for reasons that include the following: beliefs that informal 
avenues are more effective; fear of blame, retaliation, or not being believed; and concerns regarding the 
effectiveness of internal complaint procedures). 
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stances may appropriately be addressed in any 
case when litigating the first element of the de-
fense.57 
 
 Many lower courts, however, seem to have gone much fur-
ther, treating EEO-related internal compliance structures as both nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for liability avoidance. For example, 
some lower courts have treated antiharassment policies and internal 
complaint procedures as in-and-of-themselves legally sufficient to es-
tablish the reasonableness of the employers attempts to prevent or 
correct harassment.58 Similarly, many lower courts have seemed to 
treat internal compliance structures as a necessary condition for li-
ability avoidance, ruling that employers without such structures can-
not establish the affirmative defense.59 
 Although the true extent to which EEO-related internal com-
pliance structures result in systematic differences in the rate and 
amount of employer liability is an empirical question that has not 
fully been answered, two points are clear.60 First, legal compliance 
professionals have cleverly, but predictably, packaged EEO internal 
compliance structures into absolute necessities for employers hoping 
to avoid huge liabilities.61 Second, there has been an increasing em-
                                                                                                             
 57. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 58. See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that if there is no evi-
dence that an employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy 
was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, the existence of such a policy militates strongly in favor of a 
conclusion that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct sexual harass-
ment (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807)); Citroner v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 328, 
341 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent racial harassment 
because it had adopted an antiharassment policy and a complaint procedure).  See also, Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harass-
ment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 125, 141 (discussing the role of harass-
ment training in lower court decisions after Ellerth and Faragher) (hereafter, Bisom-Rapp, Watches). 
 59. See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding, as a matter of law, that 
defendant employer could never show that it had exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any harassing behavior because it had no policy specifically aimed at sexual harassment, 
only a nondiscrimination policy). 
 60. Lauren Edelman provides some evidence on this point in an empirical study conducted shortly 
after the decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, which replaced the existing standard of strict vi-
carious liability with a duty-based liability standard.  Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 
(1986).  At the time of the study, only 116 cases had been decided since the Meritor decision.  Edelman 
et al., Legal Regulation, supra note 134 at 440.  Of those 116, 91% indicated that a well-crafted internal 
grievance procedure would insulate the employer from liability and in 36% of the cases the employers 
grievance procedures did insulate the company from liability.  Id.  Furthermore, Edelman found that 
courts were becoming increasingly willing to defer to employers grievance procedures when assessing 
liability.  Id. At 442.  If true, the percentage of cases in which the employers EEO internal compliance 
structures provide insulation from liability could be much higher today.   
 61. See, e.g., Gruner, supra note 33, at 163 (stating that the liability standards in the EEO field . . 
. make compliance program quality the key to reducing certain forms of employer liability); Ellen 
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phasis during litigation on the employers internal compliance struc-
tures, with plaintiffs lawyers and the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission seeking to determine how much money the em-
ployer has spent on such structures, the content of training sessions, 
and the expertise of diversity trainers and human resources person-
nel.62 
IV. DETERRENCE UNDER INTERNAL COMPLIANCE-BASED 
LIABILITY REGIMES 
 Unfortunately, the empirical evidence regarding the role of in-
ternal compliance structures in reducing organizational misconduct 
provides little reason to approach with enthusiasm the U.S. legal sys-
tems movement to internal compliance-based organizational liability 
regimes. Surprisingly little empirical evidence exists regarding the ef-
fectiveness of internal compliance structures in deterring organiza-
tional misconduct -- a disturbing fact given the legal regimes heavy 
reliance on such structures as a liability determinant. Even more dis-
turbing, however, is the fact that the evidence that does exist is decid-
edly mixed, with many of the most recent and methodologically 
sound studies finding no significant correlation between the most 
widely-used internal compliance structures and reduced organiza-
tional misconduct. 
 This Part analyzes the empirical evidence regarding three 
types of internal compliance structures on which the United States 
legal regime places special reliance: ethics or conduct codes, the 
OSG-recommended internal compliance structures, and diversity or 
harassment training. As will be shown, there is insufficient empirical 
evidence to conclude that any of these mechanisms deter organiza-
tional misconduct. 
A. Ethics Codes 
 Despite the pervasiveness of ethics codes in corporate Amer-
ica and the importance ascribed to them by the U.S. legal regime, lit-
tle evidence exists to support the theory that ethics codes modify em-
ployee behavior. Although some studies do find a significant relation-
ship between ethics codes and employee conduct, they are plagued 
                                                                                                             
McLaughlin & Carol Merchasin, Training Becomes Important Step to Avoid Liability, Natl L.J., Jan. 
29, 2001, at B10 ([E]ngaging in quality training in conjunction with a well-written policy will likely 
translate into successfully meeting the good-faith defense of Kolstad.); Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra 
note 58 at 139 (quoting training advocates and attorneys as stating that Ellerth and Faragher require 
harassment training and that such training will insulate employers from liability).  
 62. McLaughlin & Merchasin, supra note 61. 
22 FLORIDA STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
with methodological problems, such as a failure to query respondents 
on or identify modified behavior due to ethics codes (as opposed to 
merely asking respondents whether they believe that ethics codes are 
an important factor affecting behavior), a reliance on hypothetical di-
lemmas in lab settings (as opposed to observing actual conduct in an 
employment setting), and a sole reliance on self-reporting.63  
 Furthermore, these findings are contradicted by a large num-
ber of studies finding no significant relationship between ethics codes 
and employee conduct.64 Typical of these is a recent study in which 
respondents were unable to provide specific examples of instances in 
which employees had altered their behavior due to ethics codes, 
overwhelmingly indicated that their employers conduct codes had 
not altered their conduct, and asserted that they had never referred to 
their employers conduct codes.65 
 Of course, ethics codes are only one type of internal compli-
ance structure and, moreover, are a very superficial one. Perhaps re-
searchers have been unable to document a link between ethics codes 
and ethical conduct because supporting compliance structures, such 
as those required by the OSGs, are necessary to deter organizational 
misconduct. 
B. The OSGs 
 Unfortunately, very little research has attempted to verify 
whether the assumption underlying the OSGs (that internal compli-
                                                                                                             
 63. See, e.g., Alan Kitson, Taking the Pulse: Ethics and the British Cooperative Bank, 15 J. Bus. 
Ethics 1021 (1996) (interviews with seventeen bank managers); Donald L. McCabe et al., The Influence 
of Collegiate and Corporate Codes of Conduct on Ethics-Related Behavior in the Workplace, 6 Bus. 
Ethics Q. 461 (1996) (questionnaire to 328 college graduates); Margaret Anne Pierce & John W. Henry, 
Computer Ethics: The Role of Personal, Informal, and Formal Codes, 15 J. Bus. Ethics 425 (1996) 
(questionnaire responses from 356 data-processing management professionals). 
 64. See, e.g., Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing Some Determinant Effects of Ethical Consult-
ing Behavior: The Case of Personal and Professional Values, 12 J. Bus. Ethics 449 (1993) (question-
naire survey of 207 national business consultants); Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. & Allen P. Webb, Business 
Ethics: A View from the Trenches, 37 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 8 (1995) (interviews with thirty middle manag-
ers); Arthur P. Brief et al., Whats Wrong with the Treadway Commission Report? Experimental Analy-
ses of the Effects of Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 15 J. 
Bus. Ethics 183 (1996) (questionnaires and experiment with nearly 400 executives and controllers); 
Victor J. Callan, Predicting Ethical Values and Training Needs in Ethics, 11 J. Bus. Ethics 761 (1992) 
(questionnaires from 226 state government employees); Margaret Anne Cleek & Sherry Lynn Leonard, 
Can Corporate Codes of Ethics Influence Behavior?, 17 J. Bus. Ethics 619 (1998) (questionnaires from 
150 graduate and undergraduate business students). However, many of these studies suffer from the 
same methodological problems that beset those studies finding a significant relationship between ethics 
codes and employee conduct. 
 65. M. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behav-
iour, 32 J. Bus. Ethics 247, 253 (2001) (concluding that although ethics codes may have the potential to 
alter employee behavior, this appears to take place on very rare occasions). 
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ance structures such as those recommended in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual reduce the incidence of organizational miscon-
duct) withstands empirical testing. In fact, only three large-scale stud-
ies seek systematically to test the assumptions of the OSG recom-
mendations.66 None of the studies supported the hypothesis that the 
OSG-recommended internal compliance structures deter illegal con-
duct. 
 Indeed, two of the studies found unanticipated positive corre-
lations between internal compliance structures and legal violations. 
The study authors attributed these findings to the possibility that in-
ternal compliance structures, such as those recommended by the 
OSGs, may serve primarily a window-dressing function designed 
only to reduce legal liability.67 
C. Diversity and Harassment Training 
 Finally, due to Supreme Court and lower court interpretations 
of EEO law, diversity training (including harassment training) has 
become an increasingly common type of internal compliance struc-
ture. A 1998 study by the Society for Human Resource Management, 
for example, found that seventy-five percent of Fortune 500 firms 
and thirty-six percent of other firms have a diversity training program 
of some sort.68  
 Nonetheless, there is little empirical support for the proposi-
tion that diversity training reduces discriminatory conduct. In a recent 
working paper, Katerina Bezrukova and Karen Jehn of the Wharton 
School reviewed twenty empirical studies published in major man-
                                                                                                             
 66. See M. Cash Mathews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and Misbehavior, in 9 Re-
search in Corporate Social Performance and Policy 107, 125 (W. Frederick ed., 1987) (examining the 
incidence of civil and administrative actions taken by four federal regulatory agencies against 485 cor-
porations from 1973 through 1980 and concluding that there is little relationship between codes of 
conduct [and enforcement mechanisms] and corporate violations); McKendall et al., supra note 30 (a 
longitudinal study finding that the presence of OSG-recommended compliance structures do not reduce 
the incidence of OSHA violations); Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, 
Choice, and Corporate Illegality, 8 Org. Sci. 624 (1997). 
 67. Mathews, supra note 66, at 125 (finding a positive correlation between certain aspects of con-
duct code content--such as codes that require compliance affidavits by employees or that mention 
maintaining the reputation of the corporation--and the number of legal violations and concluding that 
perhaps executives at law-abiding corporations do not feel the need to convince others of their good 
reputation); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 380 (finding a positive correlation between the OSG-
recommended internal compliance structures and the incidence of willful and repeat OSHA violations 
and concluding that, because willful and repeat violations are the type most likely to include senior 
management involvement or knowledge, organizations may be using the OSG-recommended internal 
compliance structures to hide management involvement in, or reduce organizational liability for, pur-
poseful illegal activity). 
 68. Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organizational Development Ap-
proach to Creating Diversity, 30 Organizational Dynamics 149, 149 (2001). 
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agement, psychological, and sociological journals and concluded that 
[h]aving reviewed the available empirical studies on the effects of 
diversity training programs in corporations and on campuses it is ob-
vious that it is too soon to draw any comprehensive conclusions.69 
Although much of the empirical research reviewed by Professors 
Bezrukova and Jehn identified improvements in diversity training 
participants awareness of diversity issues,70 only one of the studies 
documented sustained attitudinal or behavioral changes.71  
 Similarly, in the most comprehensive study of diversity train-
ing and other EEO compliance measures ever undertaken, Alexandra 
Kalev, Frank Dobbin, and Erin Kelley combine survey information 
on affirmative action and diversity programs from 800 American em-
ployers with annual federal data on their workforce composition from 
1971 to 1999.TP72PT  As a general rule, organizations that implemented 
diversity training programs did not significantly improve managerial 
                                                                                                             
 69. Katerina Bezrukova & Karen A. Jehn, The Effects of Diversity Training Programs 16 (July 
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 70. Id. at 10-11; see also Heidi Tarr Henson, Gauging the Outcomes of Organizational Diversity 
Implementations: The Intersection of Attitudes, Awareness and Behavior, 60 Dissertation Abstracts 
Intl 2325 (2000) (finding that diversity training achieved an awareness of diversity issues, but did not 
result in attitudinal changes); Dick Wallace Kracht, Diversity Training Among Manufacturing Compa-
nies: Reaction and Learning in a For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Work Environment, 59 Dissertation Ab-
stracts Intl 2,345 (1999) (finding an increase in perceived learning among 141 employees after diver-
sity training); Dana Yavette Law, An Evaluation of a Cultural Diversity Training Program, 59 Disserta-
tion Abstracts Intl 2,468 (1998) (finding improved awareness of diversity issues in training group 
relative to control group); Jean A. Mausehund et al., Diversity Training: Effects of an Intervention 
Treatment on Nonverbal Awareness, 58 Bus. Comm. Q. 27 (1995) (finding a positive link between di-
versity training and awareness of nonverbal factors in interpersonal communications between people 
from different cultures); David L. Tan et al., Changes in Attitude After Diversity Training, 50 Training 
& Dev. 54 (1996) (finding a significant increase in diversity awareness in 739 managers after diversity 
training workshops).  
 71. See Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 69, at 11-13. Compare Taylor Cox, Jr., The Multicultural 
Organization, 5 Executive 34, 45 (1991) (finding that Race Relations Competence Workshops re-
sulted in more positive attitudes toward African Americans and better inter-race relations among work-
shop participants), with Sara Rynes & Benson Rosen, What Makes Diversity Programs Work?, 39 H.R. 
Mag. 67 (1994) (surveying 785 members of the Society for Human Resource Management and finding 
positive short-term impact of diversity training on attitudes but less positive long-term benefits); Diane 
Marie Govern, The Effect of Diversity Awareness Training on Oral Presentation Ratings, 58 Disserta-
tion Abstracts Intl 5,681 (1998) (finding no correlation between diversity training and ratings of oral 
presentations by black and white police sergeant candidates); Henson, supra note 70, at 2,325 (finding 
no attitudinal change in respondents from diversity training). Bezrukova and Jehn reviewed five studies 
that tested the impact of diversity training programs on college campuses. Bezrukova & Jehn, supra note 
69, at 12.  Three of the studies found a small positive correlation between diversity training and attitudes 
toward ethnic minorities.  However, the authors attributed this variation to self-selection bias, rather than 
to a real change in attitudes. Id. at 12-13.   
 Further compromising the effectiveness of diversity training are two factors: first, the backlash 
that may result; and, second, the attempt to sterilize diversity training sessions in anticipation of the 
fact that statements made may be admitted as evidence during litigation. 
TP
72
PT Alexandra Kalev, Frank Dobbin, & Erin Kelly, Two to Tango: Affirmative Action, Diversity Pro-
grams and Women and African Americans in Management (working draft on file with the author). 
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diversity and, in fact, tended to significantly decrease the odds of 
women in management positions.TP73PT  Although the authors did find 
that some affirmative action and diversity measures (especially those 
programs designed to couple rhetoric regarding diversity goals 
with activities designed to promote diversity) had significant, posi-
tive impacts on the odds of women and minorities in management, 
particularly at employers that are government contractors, they con-
clude that diversity measures designed to counter managerial bias, 
including diversity training, are least effective.TP74 
 In the end, Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly conclude that at least 
some types of EEO internal compliance structures can enhance diver-
sity, if coupled with legal accountability.  Their study demonstrates, 
however, how much we have yet to learn about the impacts of EEO 
compliance structures on different demographic groups and the cir-
cumstances under which even the most promising EEO compliance 
structures can be expected to combat discrimination.  In the rapid 
move to internal compliance-based organizational liability, however, 
such distinctions appear to have been uniformly ignored. 
As extensively discussed by Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp, the 
empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of sexual harassment 
training is equally sparse.TP75PT  As noted by two researchers in the field, 
[t]he unpleasant empirical truth is that almost nothing is known 
                                                                                                             
TP
73
PT With respect to all employers, diversity training had a significant, negative impact on the odds 
of black women in management positions and no significant impact on the odds of white women and 
black men in management positions.  Id. At 53, Table 2.  When this data is broken down into the impact 
of diversity training at government contractors (who are subject to affirmative action obligations) versus 
non-contractors, however, diversity training is shown to negatively impact the odds of both white and 
black women in management positions while failing to significantly impact the odds of black men.  In 
contrast, among employers that are government contractors, diversity training had a significant, positive 
impact on the odds of white women in management positions, while failing to impact the odds of black 
men or black women.  Id. At 54, Table 3. 
TP
74
PT Id. at 37-38.  Many diversity measures impacted different demographic groups differently.  For 
example, a program or measure might improve the odds of white women in management while at the 
same time negatively impacting or failing to significantly impact the odds of black men in management.  
Id. at 53-54, Tables 2 and 3.  However, as a general rule, measures designed to combat the decoupling 
of diversity rhetoric from action (such as affirmative action plans, diversity committees, and diversity 
staff committees) enhanced managerial diversity more than did other measures.  In addition, the effec-
tiveness of different measures varied across type of employer:  Diversity measures tended to be more ef-
fective at government contractors, who are subject to affirmative action obligations, than at non-
contractors.  Id.   
TP
75
PT Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra note 58 at 142-44; Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention is 
a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and 
Prevention In Employment Discrimination Law, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Disc. L. 101, 130-36 (2001) 
(hereafter, Bisom-Rapp, Ounce); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Sub-
stance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 967-976 (1999) (argu-
ing that many employers adopt minimally disruptive symbolic compliance policies and procedures that 
result in little, if any, substantive change in the employment environment). 
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about the effects of sexual harassment education and training pro-
grams.TP76PT  Given the dearth of research on the effects of sexual har-
assment training, many social scientists are alarmed at the unwaver-
ing commitment of employers and compliance professionals to har-
assment training.TP77PT 
Moreover, the existing research on the effects of harassment 
training fails to support the hypothesis that harassment training alters 
employee conduct.  Although some studies do support the notion that 
harassment training increases trainees awareness of potential in-
stances of harassment, many researchers doubt that the training has 
long term effects on attitudes or behavior.TP78PT 
D. Summary 
 In sum, the data regarding the effectiveness of internal com-
pliance-based organizational liability regimes is both preliminary and 
disturbing. First, the fact that the U.S. legal regime has so quickly 
transitioned to internal compliance-based liability regimes based on 
such limited and conflicting evidence is troubling.  The existing stud-
ies are insufficient in number, methodology, and scope to warrant 
such a move.  Nonetheless, this trend should not be surprising, given 
the political influence of those who benefit most from an internal 
compliance-based liability regime--organizational defendants and the 
legal compliance professionals who serve them.  
Perhaps more importantly, the evidence that does exist regard-
ing the effectiveness of internal compliance-based liability regimes 
suggests that many types of widely-used internal compliance struc-
tures currently considered to demonstrate good faith organizational 
attempts to comply with the law are ineffective at reducing organiza-
tional misconduct.  Even the Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study, which 
concludes that EEO internal compliance structures can enhance EEO 
compliance under some circumstances, demonstrates the dangers of 
an ill-conceived internal-compliance based liability regime.  If that 
regime rewards organizations even for those compliance measures 
that decouple compliance rhetoric from compliance activity or that 
have been shown to be of limited effectiveness then such a regime 
may fail to accomplish  and may even thwart  the goal of reducing 
organizational misconduct.79  
                                                                                                             
TP
76
PT Robert S. Moyer & Anjan Nath, Some Effects of Brief Training Interventions on Perceptions of 
Sexual Harassment, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 334 (1998) (quoted in Bisom-Rapp, Watches, 
supra note 58 at 142.) 
TP
77
PT Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra note 58 at 142-143. 
TP
78
PT Id. at 123-24. 
79 The Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly study also demonstrates that even when internal compliance struc-
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 In short, given the theoretical problems inherent in internal 
compliance-based liability regimes discussed in Part II of this Article 
and the large and politically powerful interest groups that stand to 
benefit from such a regime, defenders of the move to a internal com-
pliance-based organizational liability systems should bear the burden 
of proving the effectiveness of internal compliance structures in re-
ducing organizational misconduct. The analysis of the available em-
pirical evidence detailed in this Part indicates that this burden has not 
been met. 
V. EXPLAINING THE ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME 
 Why does the law place so much reliance on factors, such as 
internal compliance structures, that appear to have little impact on the 
incidence of organizational misconduct? This Part explores two pos-
sible explanations: (1) an over-reliance on principal-agent models of 
organizational misconduct and (2) public-choice explanations. 
A. Principal-Agent Models of Misconduct 
 One potential explanation for the legal regimes heavy reli-
ance on internal compliance structures as a liability determinant is an 
over-reliance on principal-agent models of organizational miscon-
duct.80 In other words, current legal theory largely assumes that mis-
conduct within organizations results from the acts of single, inde-
pendent agents who disregard the preferences of shareholder princi-
pals and their representatives--the board of directors and senior man-
agement.81 In the more sophisticated version of this argument, even 
                                                                                                             
tures provide some positive results, they may be accompanied by unintended negative consequences.  
For example, some diversity measures appeared to benefit one demographic group at the expense of an-
other, although both groups were the ostensible beneficiaries of the measures.  See Kalev, Dobbin, & 
Kelly at 53-54, Tables 2-3. (finding that some diversity measures increase the odds of management posi-
tions for one minority demographic group, while decreasing it for one or more other minority demo-
graphic groups). 
 80. 
See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 2, at 834 (These agents are rational self-interested utility 
maximizers who commit crimes in order to benefit themselves. In pursuit of his own self-interest an 
agent may commit a crime that incidentally benefits the corporation, but this is not its purpose.); 
Kevin Huff, The Role Of Corporate Compliance Programs In Determining Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity: A Suggested Approach, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1252, 1288-89 (1996) (arguing that, [c]ourts should 
recognize,however, that corporate employees are rational self-interested utility maximizers who com-
mit crimes in order to benefit themselves. In pursuit of his own self-interest an agent may commit a 
crime that incidentally benefits the corporation, but this is not its purpose.) (quoting Arlen, supra this 
note); Julie Rose OSullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor 
Schneyers Proposal, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1, 19, n.82 (2002) (criticizing the view of organizational 
misconduct as the behavior of a single, errant agent). 
 81. In the majority of large organizations in which organizational misconduct is detected, active 
participation in or direct knowledge of the misconduct is rarely attributable to senior management and 
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when misconduct is undertaken in order to enhance corporate profit-
ability or performance, the primary motivation is to promote or safe-
guard the careers of the agents undertaking the misconduct.82 
 If the law over-relies on principal-agent models of organiza-
tional misconduct, then one can see why the legal system might place 
too much emphasis on internal compliance structures as a liability de-
terminant. If organizational misconduct is simply an agency cost 
problem, then internal compliance structures--such as internal moni-
toring and reporting, employee training, and conduct codes--might 
reduce such problems by increasing the ease with which shareholder 
principals (through senior management and boards of directors) can 
monitor employee and mid-level management agents.83 
 Unfortunately, however, organizational misconduct is much 
more complicated than this. The simple principal-agent model of or-
ganizational misconduct embodied in much legal theory conflates the 
concepts of what sociologists refer to as organizational misconduct--
conduct undertaken at least in part to benefit the organization--and 
occupational misconduct--conduct undertaken solely to benefit the 
perpetrator and from which the organization derives no benefit.84 In-
deed, the organization may actually be the victim of occupational 
misconduct, as in the case of embezzlement, for example. 
 Because the agent derives no direct benefit from organiza-
tional misconduct, the personal benefits from such actions must de-
rive from increased pay, status, or job security because the miscon-
duct in question at least contributes to the appearance of organiza-
tional profitability.85  Unless organizational agents systematically 
miscalculate the probability that organizational misconduct will posi-
tively impact the bottom line, then, by definition, their conduct must 
create real or apparent profits. Real profits in excess of real costs 
will, of course, always benefit shareholder principals. In addition, the 
                                                                                                             
even more rarely to the board of directors. 
 82. Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. 
Rev. 315, 319 (1991). 
 83. By focusing on the costs and benefits of organizational misconduct to shareholders, I do not 
mean to imply that other organizational stakeholders are unaffected by such actions. Indeed, as demon-
strated by recent events at Enron and Arthur Anderson, often low-level employees, creditors, and other 
stakeholders far removed from the misconduct in question are greatly harmed by organizational miscon-
duct. 
 84. See sources cited supra note 1 (defining organizational misconduct). 
 85. See Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Key to Risk Management: Management, in Risk Management: 
Challenge and Opportunity 103 (Michael Frenkel et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that the academic finance 
and management literature has failed to develop a sufficient understanding of organizational misbehav-
ior because it is overly focused on agency cost explanations when, in many of the most high-profile 
misconduct examples, the agents incentives were aligned with those of his or her firm, at least in the 
beginning). 
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creation of apparent profits will sometimes benefit shareholder prin-
cipals. Therefore, as discussed below, the category of actions that 
represent attempts to increase shareholder-principal welfare may be 
larger than is typically assumed. These actions thus are not properly 
characterized as principal-agent problems. 
 Specifically, a simple agency cost model of organizational 
misconduct is incomplete in at least two ways. First, a model of or-
ganizational misconduct that treats agent misdeeds as the feat of a 
lone individual actor ignores the role played by the organizational 
system in shaping that conduct. Second, organizational misconduct 
may benefit organizational profitability and performance (and thus 
shareholder welfare) in subtle and difficult to quantify ways, meaning 
that organizational management (even when acting as the loyal 
agents of shareholder owners) may have reasons to tolerate such be-
havior that are not immediately obvious.86 
1. Organizational Environment 
 For many years now, researchers who study human behavior 
have been aware of the powerful role played by environment, includ-
ing organizational environment, in shaping individual perceptions 
and actions. Yet many legal scholars, and the legal system itself, 
steadfastly ignore any responsibility by those who create that climate 
for the acts of errant agents, except to the extent that other organiza-
tional actors were actually aware of or contributed to the misconduct. 
 Yet, senior management, through the organizational climate 
that it creates, plays an important role in shaping agent conduct. Al-
though senior management shapes the organizational environment 
(and thus employee conduct) in many ways, at least three mecha-
nisms have been extensively studied: organizational culture, incen-
tive and reward systems, and managements commitment to ethical 
conduct.87 For example, a climate in which employees are encour-
aged to or rewarded for pursuing the bottom line even at the expense 
of breaking laws or the companys conduct code is more likely to 
produce agents who violate laws and conduct codes.88 Similarly, 
                                                                                                             
 86. Discuss empirical debate on profitability. (???) 
 87. Other individual (that is, personal values), organizational (for example, organization size, de-
centralization, and financial distress), and industry (for example, concentration) factors have also been 
shown to impact organizational misconduct rates. See e.g., McKendall & Wagner, supra note 66 at 644 
(finding that organizational size, structure, complexity, and industry concentration are significant factors 
impacting the incidence of corporate illegality); McKendall et al., supra note 30 at 376 (finding that 
lower firm profitability is positively associated with firm OSHA violations) and at 368 (discussing ear-
lier studies that find illegal activity is more likely in firms facing financial pressure). 
 88. See, e.g., Allen & Davis, supra note 64 at 449 (finding that corporate culture and reward sys-
tems--rather than ethics codes--impact employee behavior); Anita Jose & Mary S. Thibodeux, Institu-
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lower level employees are likely to take their cues regarding what 
behavior is acceptable from senior management and coworkers. 
Agents who believe that managements commitment to the obser-
vance of laws and organizational rules is symbolic rather than real are 
more likely to disregard those laws and rules.89 
 Finally, the compensation and reward system employed by 
management may greatly affect employee behavior. Rewards and 
punishments that are performance-based and fail to properly account 
for the method by which performance goals are attained are likely to 
result in more violations than a reward and punishment system that 
more carefully accounts for the means by which performance goals 
are attained.90 
 I am not asserting that, as a general rule, organizational liabil-
ity regimes should attempt to account for factors related to the inci-
dence of organizational misconduct--such as organizational culture, 
incentive and reward systems, and managements commitment to 
ethical actions--by directly incorporating them into liability, sanction-
ing, or prosecutorial determinations.91 Like determinations regarding 
the effectiveness of internal compliance structures, an analysis of 
these factors by legal decisionmakers is likely to be difficult, costly, 
and fraught with errors.92 Nor am I attempting to exonerate culpable 
                                                                                                             
tionalization of Ethics: The Perspectives of Managers, 22 J. Bus. Ethics 133, 139 (1999) (finding that 
98.8% of managers surveyed ranked top management support and that 93% ranked corporate culture 
above factors such as conduct codes and training programs as important in encouraging ethical corporate 
conduct). 
 89. See sources cited supra note 12 (discussing the importance of managerial attitudes and behav-
ior in deterring organizational misconduct). 
 90. Allen & Davis, supra note 64 at 449 (finding that organizational reward systems signifi-
cantly impact employee behavior); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into The Responsibility Of 
Corporations And Their Officers And Directors For Corporate Climate: The Psychology Of Enron's 
Demise, 35 Rutgers L.J. 1, 34-40 (2003)(discussing organizational reward and compensation systems). 
 91. Lawmakers have on several occasions demonstrated an awareness that factors such as organ-
izational culture and reward systems may contribute to organizational misconduct. See, e.g., U.S. Sen-
tencing Commn, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines 54 (2003) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Report] (urging organizations to promote an organizational cul-
ture that encourages a commitment to compliance with the law), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/advgrprpt/AG_Final.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2005); News Release, SEC, SEC 
Chairman Levitt Receives Compensation Committees Report Highlighting Industry Best Practices; 
Calls On Entire Industry to Review Closely (Apr. 10, 1995) (warning that the compensation system used 
by many broker-dealers provides incentives to churn customer accounts and recommend unsuitable in-
vestments), available at 1995 WL 154267. 
 92. There are likely to be some instances where the connection between organizational incentive 
systems and organizational misconduct is quite clear. One commonly cited example is the complaint 
brought against Sears, Roebuck & Company by consumers and attorneys general in more than forty 
states. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1994, 
at 106, 107. In an attempt to revive lagging sales in its automotive service centers, Sears management 
imposed minimum work quotas, productivity incentives, product-specific sales quotas, paid its automo-
tive service salesmen and mechanics with commissions based on sales, and exerted considerable pres-
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individual actors by suggesting that a focus on the environment that 
contributed to their misconduct is warranted. Instead, my goal is sim-
ply to demonstrate the extraordinary amount of influence that the or-
ganization (through senior management) has on the level of miscon-
duct in its ranks--an influence that is obscured by perceptions of or-
ganizational misconduct as an agency cost problem stemming from 
the acts of individual deviant agents. 
2. Misconduct and Organizational Performance 
 In addition, many legal scholars assume, either implicitly or 
explicitly, that many forms of agent misconduct provide no potential 
benefits to the organization itself. My goal in this subsection, how-
ever, is to provide several examples of conduct typically thought to 
provide no organizational benefits and to demonstrate the circum-
stances under which this assumption may be false. I do not offer con-
clusive proof that such misconduct positively impacts the bottom 
line; the research in this area is too preliminary to warrant such a 
conclusion. Instead, my goal is simply to induce greater skepticism 
toward the claim that these actions necessarily reflect the isolated 
misconduct of a single or small group of deviant agents who have 
succeeded--despite managements best efforts--to violate laws or 
company policies. 
 Some incidents of agent misconduct provide such obvious po-
tential benefits for the firm that the inevitable organizational dis-
avowals of such conduct as the acts of a deviant or rogue employee 
should be viewed with immediate skepticism.93 The most recent 
variation on this scenario has arisen in connection with the recent 
mutual fund scandal. For example, in early November 2003, state and 
federal authorities charged seven former Prudential employees with 
securities fraud in connection with mutual fund market-timing trades 
on behalf of large hedge fund clients but did not charge Prudential or 
its senior management team. The brokers claimed, however, that both 
management and the firms compliance department were fully aware 
of the trades and rewarded the brokers handsomely for the fees they 
brought in.94 
                                                                                                             
sure on automotive center employees to perform more work. Id. Predictably, many employees responded 
by defrauding customers through sales of unnecessary parts and services. Id. at 108. Sears eventually 
settled the suits for sixty million dollars. Id. 
 93. Paine, supra note 92, at 106 (noting that business executives are quick to describe any 
wrongdoing as an isolated incident, the work of a rogue employee, but that unethical business practice 
involves the tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of others and reflects the values, attitudes, beliefs, lan-
guage, and behavioral patterns that define an organizations operating culture). 
 94. David Barboza, Brokers Say Prudential Approved Trading, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2003, at C1. 
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 Other forms of organizational misconduct, however, may 
provide less obvious organizational benefits. This section discusses 
three examples of agent misconduct that, at first blush, seem to pro-
vide no potential benefits for shareholder principals: rogue trading, 
discrimination, and financial fraud. 
a) Rogue Trading 
 Rogue, or unauthorized, trading may appear to be a classic 
example of occupational--as opposed to organizational--misconduct 
that causes only harm to the corporate enterprise, as evidenced by the 
many large and highly publicized rogue trading losses throughout the 
years. This perception of rogue trading as isolated incidences of oc-
cupational misconduct is reinforced by the presence of extensive 
written conduct codes and costly compliance programs apparently 
designed to deter unauthorized trading. However, the same environ-
ment that gives rise to rogue trading may also foster other traits--for 
example, greed, independence, and risk-taking--that result in more 
profitable traders.95 As a result, shareholder principals may be willing 
to tolerate some rogue trading losses, so long as they are offset by the 
benefits of a more profitable trading floor. 
 First, traders tend to have a heightened sense of materialism, 
because the trading floor climate is designed to foster such an atti-
tude.96 Rather than rewarding successful traders with impressive titles 
or moves up the career ladder, the trading floor hierarchy tends to 
                                                                                                             
According to the Massachusetts Securities Division, charges may be brought against Prudential if it ap-
pears that high-level executives knew about or sanctioned the illicit trades. Id. As previously stated, 
however, such direct knowledge of or participation in organizational misconduct by senior management 
is extremely rare. Instead, the far more typical situation occurs when management creates an environ-
ment in which such conduct is encouraged and rewarded. Often, the most that can be concluded is that 
management set up a system that allowed or encouraged the misconduct to take place, then took steps to 
remain willfully ignorant of the behavior. See, e.g., id. (discussing vacations, bonuses, and management 
praise bestowed on the indicted brokers due to the large commissions earned on their hedge fund ac-
counts). 
 95. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 
Or. L. Rev. 301, 316 (2000) (arguing that some financial institutions have made a conscious decision to 
foster an organizational climate that gives rise to at least some rogue trading, because to do so may 
maximize trading floor profits, and thus management compensation and status). The problem is likely 
exacerbated by a variety of behavioral factors, including the tendency to trust those whom we have 
trusted in the past. Because the events that give rise to large rogue-trading losses involve serial deci-
sionmaking and substantial sunk costs, supervisors and others within the firm may tend towards an irra-
tional escalation of commitment. Id. 
 96. Mitchel Y. Abolafia, Making Markets: Opportunism and Restraint on Wall Street 18 
(1996). As stated by one bond trader, [m]oney is more than just a medium of exchange; it is a measure 
of ones winnings. It provides an identity that prevails over charisma, physical attractiveness, or socia-
bility as the arbiter of success and power on the bond-trading floor. The top-earning trader is king of the 
mountain. Id. at 30. 
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consist only of traders who earn more money for the firm and receive 
higher bonuses, versus traders who earn less.97   
 Second, only individuals comfortable with taking large risks 
are attracted to, and survive in, trading floor jobs.98 The compensation 
structure at most trading institutions, which is based almost exclu-
sively on trading profits earned in the current fiscal year, exacerbates 
this attitude by sending a message that short-term profitability will be 
rewarded even if incurred at the cost of taking greater risks.99 The 
high number of largely unsuccessful attempts by financial institutions 
to revise traders compensation packages indicates that managers of 
financial institutions are aware of the potentially perverse incentives 
being created, but have yet to find a mechanism for eradicating them 
that is compatible with encouraging the most profitable trading 
strategies.100 
 Finally, traders tend to be self-reliant and entrepreneurial, op-
erating in an independent and often uncooperative environment. As a 
result, traders may view their primary obligation as maximizing the 
value of their own account and feel little duty to supervise those 
around them for potential violations of trading rules.101 
                                                                                                             
 97. Krawiec, supra note 95, at 329. 
 98. The impact of organizational environment and selection processes on individual risk-taking at-
titudes and behavior has been a subject of study for many researchers. See, e.g., James G. March & Zur  
Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33 Mgmt. Sci. 1404 (1987). March and 
Shapira explain that 
[a]lthough they [(managers)] undoubtedly vary in their individual 
propensities to take risks, those variations are obscured by processes 
of selection that reduce the heterogeneity among managers and en-
courage them to believe in their ability to control the odds, by systems 
of organizational controls and incentives that dictate risk taking behav-
ior in significant ways, and by variations in the demand for risk taking 
produced by the context within which choice takes place. 
Id. at 1414. 
 99. Krawiec, supra note 95, at 330; When Words Are Not Bonds: Wall Street Pay, Economist, 
Feb. 19, 1994, at 90 (stating that Wall Street bonuses account for at least 75% of total remuneration). 
 100. For example, after its own rogue trading scandal in 1994, Salomon Brothers attempted to re-
vise its compensation system by providing investment bankers, traders, and other employees with as 
much as half their pay in Salomon Brothers stock at a fifteen percent discount, which could not be sold 
for five years. Michael Siconolfi, Salomon Looks at Backing Out of Pay Plan, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 
1995, at C1. After the announcement, Salomon lost twenty of its two hundred managing directors, in-
cluding several top traders. Id. The plan was discontinued. Id.; see also Pay Dirt: Salomon Brothers, 
Economist, July 1, 1995, at 67. Attempts at such revisions by other financial institutions have met with 
a similar fate. See Bonus Points, Economist, Apr. 15, 1995, at 71 (discussing efforts at various financial 
services firms to restructure their compensation systems in an effort to reduce agency costs and unau-
thorized activities). 
 101. Abolafia, supra note 96, at 28-29; Gordon L. Clark, Rogues and Regulation in Global Fi-
nance: Maxwell, Leeson and the City of London, 31 Regional Stud. 221, 226 (stating that [t]he firm 
deliberately sets-off their traders one against the other, and from the firms own resources so that each 
traders performance can be directly compared; group-based or team-based organizational modes of 
trading are eschewed at this level of the firm in favour of a model which can identify and reward the 
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 Although these traits may contribute to rogue traders who 
violate the firms risk and loss limits, firms may tolerate--and even 
encourage--those traits because such tolerance also may create more 
profitable traders. For example, a recent comparison of United States 
and Japanese trading floors shows that U.S. trading firms tend to fol-
low a market-control pattern in which traders are given high au-
thority, few risk or loss limits, and high incentive compensation.102 
Japanese trading firms, by contrast, tend to follow a bureaucratic 
control pattern under which traders have little discretion, strict risk 
and loss limits, low incentive compensation, and a high level of or-
ganizational control.103 The study found that the market-control firms 
were significantly more profitable than their bureaucratic-control 
counterparts and were willing to tolerate higher levels of acceptable 
risk. In other words, traders at market-control-style firms had shared 
values regarding the acceptability of higher risk levels within the 
firm.104  
b) Discrimination 
 The notion that organizational diversity is good for business 
has become a common mantra both among organizational leaders and 
in the management literature.105 Accordingly, discrimination may ap-
pear at first blush a simple matter of individual employee deviance 
                                                                                                             
best and the brightest). 
 102. Srilata A. Zaheer, Acceptable Risk: A Study of Global Currency Trading Rooms in the U.S. 
and Japan, in Performance of Financial Institutions: Efficiency, Innovation, Regulation 462 (Patrick 
T. Harker & Stavros A. Zenios eds., 2000).  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 28. Interestingly, the market-control firms did not have significantly higher levels of ac-
tual risk. This may not tell us much about the propensity for rogue trading, however. By definition, trad-
ers attempt to hide unauthorized trades from the formal control system, meaning that it may not have 
shown up in the study. Because the study was not designed to and did not measure the incidence of trad-
ing violations within the firm, it cannot be used as evidence regarding the comparative levels of actual 
rogue trading within the two types of firms. However, the findings on profitability and acceptable risk 
levels are supportive of the notion that market-control-style firms may have a propensity for both higher 
profitability and higher levels of trading violations.  
 105. Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity 
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 Admin. Sci. Q. 229, 229 (2001) (discussing 
advice in management literature that diversity enhances workgroup performance); David B. Wilkins, 
From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" To "Diversity Is Good For Business": The Rise Of Market-Based 
Diversity Arguments And The Fate Of The Black Corporate Bar, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1548, 1571-1591 
(2004) (discussing the widespread attachment to the belief that diversity enhances corporate profitability 
and competitiveness); Grutter v. Bollinger  539 U.S. 306, 330-331, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2340 (2003) (noting 
that major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and 
viewpoints.) (citing to Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae *331 5; Brief for General Motors Corp. as 
Amicus Curiae 3-4.)  
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that cannot properly be characterized as organizational misconduct.106 
Unfortunately for those with hopes for a more diverse and integrated 
American workforce, the empirical research indicates that the effect 
of diversity on organizational performance is complicated and uncer-
tain, providing both benefits and costs depending on context, time 
frame, and the type of diversity in question.107  
 For example, researchers have studied the effects of two types 
of diversity--diversity with respect to underlying attributes and di-
versity with respect to observable attributes--on several different 
measures of workgroup performance, including outcomes, processes, 
and individual perceptions and satisfaction. Diversity on underlying 
attributes--such as education, technical abilities, tenure in the organi-
zation, socioeconomic background, personality characteristics, or 
personal values--has been found in some studies to positively impact 
outcomes by expanding the set of possibilities considered and dis-
cussed, leading to more creative solutions to organizational prob-
lems.108 At the same time, however, some studies have found that di-
versity on underlying attributes negatively affects workgroup proc-
esses by imposing costs, such as increased turnover and more formal, 
less frequent communication among workgroup members.109 Some 
studies have found these process losses to be offset, however, by in-
creased contact with members outside of the workgroup, resulting in 
a broader range of ideas considered by the workgroup.110 
 In contrast, the results of research on the impact of observable 
attributes such as race, ethnicity, age, and gender provide grounds for 
more pessimism about the effects of diversity on workgroup per-
formance. For example, demographically heterogeneous groups have 
performed both better and worse than demographically homogenous 
                                                                                                             
 106. This attitude is reflected in the early case law involving workplace discrimination. See, e.g., 
Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (The issue before the Court is 
whether Title VII was intended to hold an employer liable for what is essentially the isolated and unau-
thorized sex misconduct of one employee to another. (footnote omitted)); Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, 
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stating that a supervisors harassing conduct appeared to be 
nothing more than a personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism).  
 107. Ely & Thomas, supra note 105, at 229; Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for 
Common Threads: Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 Acad. 
Mgmt. Rev. 402, 405-12 (1996) (summarizing the research on the impact of workgroup diversity on 
performance); Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. OReilly, III, Demography and Diversity in Organi-
zations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 Res. Organizational Behav. 77 (1998) (reviewing over 
eighty studies by psychologists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, communication and education 
researchers, and organizational scholars). 
 108. See Milliken & Martins, supra note 107, at 405-12 (summarizing the literature). Researchers 
consider it important, however, that the majority of studies finding positive outcome effects of diversity 
are laboratory studies rather than field studies. See Williams & OReilly, supra note 107, at 79. 
109. Williams & OReilly, supra note 107, at 94-96. 
110. Id. at 94-98. 
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groups in terms of workgroup outcomes, sometimes considering a 
greater number and diversity of alternatives in a decisionmaking task 
and sometimes not. Furthermore, some studies have shown that, to 
the extent any creativity benefits do emerge from demographically 
heterogeneous groups, such benefits are likely to emerge only after 
the group has been together for some time. 
 In addition, any positive impact on the outcome variable may 
be overshadowed by the negative impacts of demographic diversity 
on the process variable. In other words, to the extent that any out-
come benefits may emerge from workgroup heterogeneity, they may 
be outweighed by the higher transaction costs of managing a demog-
raphically diverse workforce. As a general rule, more demographi-
cally diverse workgroups experience higher turnover rates, greater 
absenteeism of the dissimilar group members, lower levels of integra-
tion and communication, and lower levels of satisfaction and identifi-
cation with the group. In addition, individuals who are dissimilar 
from their supervisors on demographic variables tend to receive 
lower performance evaluations. As noted by Frances Milliken and 
Luis Martins, [t]he consistency of these findings suggests . . . that 
groups and organizations will act systematically to drive out indi-
viduals who are different from the majority, unless this tendency to 
drive out diversity is managed.111  
 In a recent paper, Professor Donald Langevoort provides a 
different theory that, if true, also predicts a lack of organizational in-
centives for the creation of a diverse workforce. Langevoort cogently 
argues that the mechanisms by which middle managers are hired, 
tested, and promoted within many firms reward the presence of psy-
chological traits--including over-confidence, risk taking, and 
grease--that are more commonly found in white males than in other 
demographic groups.112 If this is true, then corporate Americas 
mechanisms for selecting top managers may result in more profitable 
companies that exclude women and minorities from their upper ranks 
and impose other negative externalities on society through the choice 
of business decisions that they make. 
 According to Langevoort, many companies organize middle 
managers into work teams that must solve some set of problems and 
                                                                                                             
 111. Milliken & Martins, supra note 107, at 420; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The 
Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1757, 1788 (2003) (book review) (arguing 
that greater employee homogeneity decreases the transaction costs of managing a [diverse] work-
force). 
 112. Donald C. Langevoort, Diversity and Discrimination from a Corporate Perspective: Grease, 
Grit and the Personality Types of Tournament Survivors 15-16, 19-20 (forthcoming, 61 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. (2004)). 
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then negotiate with non-team members within the firm the perception 
of how the team has performed.113 Typically, middle managers are ro-
tated through different work groups and evaluated on both a team and 
individual basis.114 Accordingly, rising to the top of the management 
pool requires iterated success--more likely if the individual is confi-
dent and willing to take risks115--and necessitates a psychological 
makeup referred to by researchers as High Machiavellianism, or 
high-Mach.116  
 Both self-confidence and the tendency to take risks are be-
lieved to vary across gender, racial, and ethnic lines.117 Langevoort 
argues that the third trait required for managerial success--grease--is 
also more likely to be present in the dominant demographic group. 
He hypothesizes that greasy people--those high-Mach individuals 
who are able to effortlessly make strong in-group connections when 
required and yet defect when it is in their self-interest--are likely to 
succeed in the managerial tournament.118 By contrast, gritty people-
-those who are unable to perform this routine successfully--will 
not.119 If the process of serially forming, and then dropping, strong in-
group connections is facilitated by homogeneity, the mere fact of be-
ing different from the dominant majority may insert grit into the 
process. In other words, members of racial, gender, or cultural minor-
ity groups may be grittier simply by virtue of being different, unless 
they are willing and able to successfully mimic the behavior of white 
                                                                                                             
113. Id. at 12. 
114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 15-16. Self-confidence is positively associated with the ability to persuade others, 
greater persistence, and a willingness to take risks. Id. at 15; Simon Gervais et al., The Positive Role 
of Overconfidence and Optimism in Investment Policy (Rodney L. White Ctr. For Fin. Research, 
Working Paper No. 15-02, 2002), available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~rlwctr/papers/0215.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2005); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A 
Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 Mgmt. Sci. 17, 27-29 (1993) (arguing that optimistic bias in 
organizational judgments leads to risk-taking). In any large organization where getting ahead is based on 
iterated success of the nature described here, some percentage of lucky risk-takers are likely to distin-
guish themselves both from the unlucky risk-takers (who presumably fall out of the tournament early) 
and those who play it safe (thereby lasting in the tournament up to some point, but ultimately underper-
forming the lucky risk-takers). Langevoort, supra note 112, at 15. 
 116. Langevoort, supra note 112, at 18. High-Mach individuals possess the ability to cooperate 
and display intense in-group loyalty when necessary, while behaving in an aggressively competitive 
manner to out-group members. Id. at 17-18. Importantly, high-Mach individuals are able to seamlessly 
defect and switch to a new in-group when self-advancement so dictates. Id. at 18; see also Samuel 
Bowles et al., The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach, 39 J. Econ. Lit. 1137, 1161-62 
(2001). 
 117. Langevoort, supra note 112, at 16. 
118. Id. at 19. 
119. Id. 
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males.120 Langevoort argues that, although this may be efficient 
within the firm structure, senior executive suites . . . overpopulated 
by high-Mach risk-takers, filled with hubris, adept at self-deception, 
and empty of strong ethical grounding may create troubling negative 
externalities associated with the kind of business decisions they 
make.121 
 Similarly, the exclusion of certain demographic out-groups 
from the organization has historically been used by some corpora-
tions to inculcate employee loyalty and pride, or to increase em-
ployee productivity. For example, southern textile mills once explic-
itly refused to hire African Americans in order to create a sense of 
privilege in their white workers.122 This sense of privilege was then 
employed to justify the mills low wages and unsafe working condi-
tions.123  
 In addition, Ford Motor Company purposely excluded women 
from assembly line work during the early twentieth century. In so do-
ing, the company was able to create an image of assembly-line work 
as masculine, calling into question the manhood of employees who 
could not meet target production levels and paying those who could a 
wage that, in the words of one Ford manager at the time, would help 
them to be better men.124 Although changed social mores and the 
advent of antidiscrimination laws have presumably induced organiza-
tions to abandon such practices as a conscious or explicit mechanism 
for incentivizing labor, the research on workgroup homogeneity dis-
cussed above suggests that organizations may still derive benefits 
from the exclusion of demographic out-group members. 
 I do not mean to suggest that organizations are free to create a 
completely homogenous workforce or that senior management con-
sciously or intentionally excludes on the basis of race or gender sim-
ply to improve cooperation and loyalty among employees. Both legal 
and societal constraints militate against such behavior. In addition, I 
                                                                                                             
 120. Id. at 20; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 
1259 (2000); Naomi Ellemers et al., Sticking Together or Falling Apart: In-Group Identification as a 
Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus Individual Mobility, 72 J. Personality & 
Soc. Psychol. 617 (1997).  
124. Langevoort, supra note 112, at 22-23. 
 122. Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis 
of American Business History 28 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9029, 2002); 
David L. Carlton, Mill and Town in South Carolina, 1880-1920 (1982). 
 123. Lamoreaux et al., supra note 122, at 28. 
 124. Id. at 28-29; Wayne A. Lewchuk, Men and Monotony: Fraternalism as a Managerial Strategy 
at the Ford Motor Company, 53 J. Econ. Hist. 824, 843 (1993). 
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do not claim to have offered any proof that discriminatory behavior 
positively affects firm profits. As already noted, the state of research 
in this field is not sufficiently developed to support such a conclu-
sion. Instead, my goal is simply to call into question the automatic 
assumption that behaviors such as those discussed in this section rep-
resent pure occupational misconduct that provides no organizational 
benefits, as opposed to organizational misconduct that provides sub-
tle but tangible benefits to the organizational enterprise. If these be-
haviors do provide such benefits, then the legal regimes assumption 
that internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to curb agent 
misconduct will suffice to correct this behavior is erroneous. 
c) Financial Fraud 
 Financial fraud is particularly difficult to categorize, as the 
creation of false profitability may benefit shareholder principals un-
der some circumstances and not in others. Some instances of finan-
cial fraud undoubtedly harm shareholders. Indeed, in many cases, de-
frauding shareholders is the ultimate goal of the fraudulent scheme. 
In addition, when financial fraud is engaged in for the purpose of 
concealing poor management or creating the illusion that some divi-
sion is profitable when it is actually a drain on organizational re-
sources and should be sold, shareholders are harmed.125 
 At the same time, however, some well-known instances of fi-
nancial fraud were the result of attempts by organizational manage-
ment to create the appearance of profitability in order to derive some 
benefit--for example, outside funding--that would augment share-
holder wealth. For instance, alleged Kidder Peabody rogue trader 
Joseph Jett contended that Kidder management had full knowledge of 
and encouraged his fictitious trades because they created the tempo-
rary illusion that Kidders trading operations were profitable. This al-
lowed Kidder to obtain a large loan from Union Bank of Switzerland 
that Kidder badly needed to provide operating capital.126 
 Similarly, part of the asserted rationale for Enrons false fi-
nancial statements was that revealing the truth about its financial 
condition would result in a credit-rating downgrade, severely ham-
pering its ability to conduct its derivatives business and undermining 
                                                                                                             
 125. This is true even if a short-term shareholder owning stock only in that company would bene-
fit from an inflated stock price. Because most shares in large companies are owned by diversified share-
holders who trade securities fairly actively, portfolio value should be enhanced by accurate reporting, 
even if the value of an individual stock would be temporarily enhanced by false reporting. 
 126. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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Enrons profitability and share price.127 In addition, Enrons fraudu-
lent reporting regarding its trading floor operations was reportedly 
undertaken to enhance its share price. In other words, the allegation 
is that Enron smoothed the volatility of its trading floor profits, thus 
making the company appear less risky than it was and, correspond-
ingly, enhancing share price.128 
B. Public Choice Reasons 
 In prior work, I have presented evidence that public choice 
theory may explain some of the legal systems extreme reliance on 
internal compliance structures as a liability determinant.129 According 
to the interest group branch of public choice theory, well-organized 
interest groups are able to extract benefits from the government while 
imposing the costs on less organized groups, typically broad-based 
segments of the general public, such as consumers.130 
 As one of the most organized, effective, and well-financed in-
terest groups involved in the political process, it may seem surprising 
that business interests have not defeated the development of organ-
izational liability provisions (and the recent proliferation of organiza-
tional criminal liability provisions, in particular). Given the success 
that business interests frequently demonstrate in defeating the im-
plementation of legal rules that they consider onerous, organizational 
liability provisions thus present--at first glance--a bit of a mystery. In 
other words, why have business interests not blocked the passage of 
organizational liability provisions such as those discussed in this Ar-
ticle? 
 Although several potential explanations are plausible, one ob-
vious answer is that organizational liability provisions are not as 
costly to business organizations as they may at first appear.131 Al-
                                                                                                             
 127. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 
1275, 1323-24 (2002). 
 128. Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of May, 48 Vill. L. 
Rev. 1245, 1260 (2003); see also Patrick Barta & John D. McKinnon, Freddie May Have Understated 
Profits by up to $4.5 Billion, Wall St. J., June 26, 2003, at C1 (discussing disclosures by Freddie Mac 
that it violated accounting rules and, in some cases, understated profits in order to smooth volatility in 
earnings). 
 129. See Krawiec, supra note 21.  
 130. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 
(1971). Another branch of public choice theory, voting theory, is based on the work of Kenneth Arrow 
and holds that determinations based on majority rule may give rise to random or shifting outcomes, a 
process known as cycling. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963). 
 131. Organizational liability provisions may also reflect an agency cost problem. If the presence 
of organizational liability results in a lower probability of personal liability for corporate officers and di-
rectors, then organizational liability may represent an attempt by officers and directors to deflect their 
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though business interests and those who could face personal liability 
for organizational violations (such as boards of directors under In re 
Caremark International inc. Derivative Litigation132) would presuma-
bly prefer to suffer no organizational liability for the conduct of em-
ployee agents, a legal regime that conditions or mitigates liability on 
the basis of internal compliance structures--while expensive and 
wasteful--is far less onerous than actually altering current business 
practices or paying damages for agent misconduct. As a result, when 
the public outcry for constraints on organizational misconduct be-
comes too loud for lawmakers to ignore, business interests may agree 
to heightened organizational liability in exchange for a safe harbor 
in the form of mitigation based on internal compliance structures.133  
 At the same time, legal compliance professionals benefit im-
mensely--both financially and in terms of their importance and status 
within organizations--from a legal regime that conditions liability on 
the presence of internal compliance structures. Perhaps for this rea-
son, legal compliance professionals have been at the forefront of the 
push to adopt internal compliance structures, sometimes overstating 
to a significant degree both the risks of a failure to adopt such struc-
tures and the benefits of having such structures in place.134  
 Although both business organizations and legal compliance 
professionals have had a substantial impact on the development of in-
ternal compliance-based legal regimes in the United States, the two 
groups have made that impact in different ways. For example, busi-
ness organizations (including the Business Roundtable) lobbied hard 
for an internal compliance-based mitigation of sentences under the 
OSGs.135 By contrast, legal compliance professionals appear to have 
satisfied their agenda more indirectly and have played a particularly 
                                                                                                             
personal liability onto organizational defendants. Khanna, supra note 8, at 1253-55. 
132. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 133. See Khanna, supra note 5, at 102-03 (querying why business interests have not managed to 
extract such a safe harbor). This public outcry may be especially likely to occur following the disclosure 
of a series of corporate misdeeds during a weak economic period. Id. at 104.  For example, commenta-
tors have explained the political climate leading to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, and Sarbanes-Oxley on exactly these grounds. See, e.g., id. 
 134. See Krawiec, supra note 21 (describing this literature); Bisom-Rapp, Watches, supra note 58 
at 134-40 (describing this trend in connection with sexual harassment training); Bisom-Rapp, Ounce, 
supra note 75 at 13-15 (same). 
 135. William S. Lofquist, Legislating Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power, 
and Corporate Crime Control, 27 Law & Socy Rev. 741, 746 tbl.2 (1993) (providing figures on the 
lobbying activity of the Business Roundtable, National Association of Manufacturers, Chamber of 
Commerce, numerous corporations, and other interested public and private groups in connection with 
the OSGs); McKendall et al., supra note 30, at 370 (discussing pressure from the business community to 
adopt guidelines that account for organizations internal compliance efforts). 
42 FLORIDA STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
important role in the development of judicially crafted internal com-
pliance-based liability standards.  
 The judicial recognition of internal compliance-based liability 
defenses follows a particular pattern that highlights the important role 
played by legal compliance professionals in the development of 
common law compliance-based organizational liability standards. 
First, the tendency of legal compliance professionals to overstate 
both a new legal risk and their ability to contain that risk through in-
ternal compliance structures has been well documented.136 Several 
studies, for example, have documented the extent to which legal and 
management journals overstated the legal benefits of internal griev-
ance procedures in defending against liability in sexual harassment 
suits and the need for personnel practices designed to minimize em-
ployer liability in wrongful discharge suits.137 Second, business or-
ganizations (either unaware of, or disinterested in, the fact that the 
rendered advice is incorrect) adopt the legal compliance profession-
als recommendations.138 Third, when faced with liability decisions, 
courts look to industry standards to determine whether the organiza-
tion has met its duty to avoid the harm in question.139 As a result, the 
recommendations of internal compliance professionals become a part 
of the liability determination and deviations from them result in 
costly liability determinations. 
                                                                                                             
 136. See Krawiec, supra note 21, at 529 (discussing the evidence on this); Donald C. Langevoort 
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. 
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375 (1997). 
 137. See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated 
Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 Law & Socy Rev. 47 (1992) (studying the extent to which person-
nel, legal academic, and legal practitioner journals overstate the legal risk of wrongful discharge suits); 
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational 
Myth 105 Am. J. Soc. 406 (1999) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Legal Regulation] (studying the impact 
that legal compliance professionals had on the development of grievance procedures as a legal defense 
under sexual harassment law); Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, A Tale of Two Sectors: The Spread of Anti-
Harassment Remedies Among Public and Private Employers (draft on file with author) (studying the 
role played by personnel professionals in the development and acceptance of internal grievance proce-
dures as a defense to organizational liability in sexual harassment cases and concluding that the legal 
remedy to harassment was clearly fashioned by a group with a professional interest in promoting that 
remedy.) 
 138. See Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 137, at 40 (stating that the courts did not lead the develop-
ment of legal rules governing the role of grievance procedures as a defense in sexual harassment suits 
but instead followed what the corporations were doing at the behest of personnel professionals); Edel-
man et al., Legal Regulation, supra note 137, at 451 (documenting the diffusion of internal grievance 
procedures within organizations prior to the legitimation of the defense by the courts). 
 139. Dobbin & Kelley, supra note 137, at 40 (noting that the courts followed and legitimated what 
business organizations had been doing--adopting internal grievance procedures--rather than fashioning a 
remedy on their own); Edelman et al., Legal Regulation, supra note 137, at 440 (noting that, eventually, 
the Supreme Court legitimated the originally erroneous legal advice that personnel professionals had 
rendered regarding grievance procedures, by establishing them as part of a two-part affirmative de-
fense).  
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 At the same time, the solutions to perceived legal problems 
recommended by legal compliance professionals are more palatable 
to management, because they disrupt managerial discretion and cur-
rent business practice as little as possible. An internal compliance-
based regime thus may represent an equilibrium agreement among 
business interests, legal compliance professionals, and lawmakers 
that satisfies public demands for regulation while doing little to dis-
rupt business practices and enhancing the profitability and impor-
tance of another powerful interest group--legal compliance profes-
sionals. 
VI. THE CHOICE OF VICARIOUSLY LIABLE PARTY 
 This Article has, for the most part, addressed only the role of 
organizational liability for agent misconduct. Under some circum-
stances, however, cogent arguments can be made that senior man-
agement or board liability should supplement or substitute for the or-
ganization as the vicariously liable party. Although, this Article does 
not reject such a possibility, the obstacles to and problems with this 
approach should be briefly noted. 
 First, the limited assets of organizational agents is a com-
monly asserted rationale for organizational-level liability in the first 
place.140 Although senior managers and board members may have 
deeper pockets than lower-level violators, the harm caused by many 
acts of organizational misconduct is nonetheless likely to exceed 
most individuals assets, leading to a failure to fully internalize the 
costs of misconduct and, therefore, an underdeterrence of organiza-
tional misconduct.141 
 In addition, imposing liability--especially criminal liability--
on an individual who did not actively participate in and was unaware 
of the misconduct in question is a rare, but not unheard of, move in 
the American legal regime.142 As a result, fairness concerns are likely 
                                                                                                             
 140. See supra note 6 (discussing this argument). 
 141. Although director and officer liability insurance policies may pay for many vicarious liability 
judgments against officers and directors, because the firm typically pays the bulk of these premiums, de-
terrence may still be undermined. 
142Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 348 (2003) (noting that, although 
collective sanctions may seem natural in tribal or clan-based societies, in modern, liberal societies, 
however, where the relevant moral unit is the individual, punishing groups for the misdeeds of individu-
als will be regarded with deep skepticism.); Adam Liptak, Is the Group Responsible for the Individuals 
Crime?, 136 (14) SCHOLASTIC UPDATE 16 (May 10, 2004).  In contrast, many other cultures hold indi-
viduals or groups  for example, family members or fellow villagers  not connected to the misconduct 
responsible on the theory that such groups or individuals may be better positioned to identify and punish 
culpable individuals, and may be motivated to do so by the threat of collective liability.  Levinson, supra 
this note at 348 (stating that, [g]roup members might be punished not because they are deemed collec-
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to compel courts to impose this type of individual liability only in the 
most egregious cases, such as when the court is convinced that man-
agement knew about or recklessly determined to remain unaware of 
ongoing misconduct. If this is so, then most of the benefits of vicari-
ous liability will be lost and organizational liability will remain a 
necessary tool to deter organizational misconduct. Nonetheless, fur-
ther research into the choice of vicariously liable party is needed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 In closing, I should emphasize not only this Articles conclu-
sions, but also reinforce what it does not conclude. Specifically, it is 
not the contention of this Article that internal compliance structures 
can never play a role in deterring organizational misconduct. Indeed, 
internal compliance structures--in the hands of a competent and 
committed management team--may play a central role in the organi-
zations preventive approach to organizational misconduct, depend-
ing on the size and structure of the specific organization.143 In addi-
tion, by emphasizing the important role played by organizational cul-
ture and management commitment to ethical behavior in deterring 
misconduct, I am not advocating a legal regime in which courts, 
agencies, or prosecutors attempt to directly evaluate those factors in 
assessing organizational liability for agent misconduct. As with inter-
nal compliance structures, legal decisionmakers are unlikely to pos-
sess sufficient information to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of 
these factors in any reliable way. As a result, I conclude that the 
United States legal regimes move away from strict vicarious liability 
to internal compliance-based liability is unjustified by either theory 
or empirical evidence.  
 At the same time, the obstacles to a return to strict vicarious 
liability are strong and are both theoretical and political. As a theo-
                                                                                                             
tively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they are in an advantageous position to identify, 
monitor, and control responsible individuals, and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so.); 
Liptak, supra this note. 
 143.  See generally Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, supra note 72.  Very small, centralized organizations 
may find formal internal compliance structures unnecessary and prohibitively expensive. Perhaps for 
this reason, small businesses have expressed some concern that they are disadvantaged by the OSG re-
quirements, although firm size is taken into account in the sentencing guidelines. See Sentencing 
Guidelines, supra note 18, § 8B2.1, cmt. n.2(C). It is unclear, however, whether many small firms 
would gain the benefit of the OSG mitigation provisions, even in the absence of the internal compliance 
provisions of the Guidelines. This is because many small organizations sentenced under the Guidelines 
are ineligible for sentence mitigation, due to top-management knowledge of or participation in the mis-
conduct. John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior--The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Experi-
ment Begins to Bear Fruit (unpublished paper presented at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on 
Value Inquiry, Tulsa, OK (Apr. 26, 2001)), available at 1317 PLI/Corp. 113, 131 (2002).  
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retical matter, so long as legal academics and legal decisionmakers 
continue to view organizational misconduct as a principal-agent 
problem which can be fully addressed through better policing, and 
ignore the subtle, but tangible, benefits that may flow to the organiza-
tional enterprise from such conduct, the legal system will continue to 
gravitate toward solutions that provide incentives for policing, 
without ever addressing the root causes of organizational misconduct. 
 As a political matter, the current legal regime may exist, not 
because it effectively addresses organizational misconduct, but be-
cause it satisfies the needs of a variety of powerful interest groups, 
including business organizations and legal compliance professionals, 
while at the same time addressing the occasional (though increas-
ingly frequent) public outcry for constraints on organizational misbe-
havior.  
 
 
